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This paper presents evidence on the consequences of the 1912 introduction of "quasi-
universal" male suffrage in Italy. The reform increased the electorate from slightly 
less than three million to 8,650,000 and left the electoral rules and the district 
boundaries unchanged. This allows us to exploit the heterogeneity in 
enfranchisement rates across electoral districts to identify the causal effects of 
franchise extension on a number of political outcomes. The reform caused an 
increase in the vote share of social reformers (Socialists, Republicans and Radicals), 
together referred to as the Estrema. One standard deviation in the share of newly 
enfranchised voters over the total number of registered 1913 voters caused an 
increase of around 2% in votes for Estrema candidates but had no impact on their 
parliamentary net seat gains. Enfranchisement had also no impact on the 
parliamentary representation of aristocracy and traditional elites. Other outcomes 
(the chances of having candidates from the Estrema and the Herfindel-Hirshman 
index of electoral competition) were also unaffected, with the exception of turnout, 
which decreased. These findings show that de jure political equalization did not 
cause major changes to political representation, although the voting choices of the 
formerly and newly enfranchised citizens differed on average. This apparent puzzle 
is the consequence of the heterogeneity of the effect across a number of both social 
and political dimensions. The paper documents elite's effort to minimize the political 
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1 Introduction
The arrival of de jure political equality in most Western European countries during the late 19th
and early 20th century was often followed by rapid changes in public policy. Lindert (1994, 2004),
referring to what he de￿ned ￿the 1880-1930 laboratory￿ , documents the historical proximity be-
tween franchise expansion and public provision of education, increased spending in social transfers,
labour market reforms and the creation of income tax systems.1 Correlations between the pres-
ence of democratic institutions and the type of policies that governments implement are generally
well documented (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a). Causal evidence on the consequences of de-
mocratization is more di¢ cult to establish. Most empirical studies exploit the rich and relevant
institutional variation that occurs across countries. In such settings, however, it is di¢ cult to
convincingly establish causality.2 Natural experiments within a country have a better chance to
identify causal relations, although both the institutional changes and the potential outcomes are
necessarily more limited. Both cross-country and within-country studies also face another chal-
lenge: institutional reforms often come in ￿bundles￿ , not allowing therefore to identify the e⁄ect of
political equalization in itself. The British Second Reform Act of 1867, for example, almost doubled
the size of the electorate but, at the same time, it modi￿ed the boundaries of a vast majority of
electoral constituencies.3
This paper presents evidence on the consequences of the introduction of ￿quasi-universal￿male
su⁄rage in Italy in 1912. This reform almost trebled the size of the electorate from slightly less
than three million to 8,650,000 and left disenfranchised only about half million adult males. Figure
1 shows the number of registered voters from 1870 (year of the annexation of Rome) until fascism,
indicating with a vertical line the year of the reform. Unlike the 1882 and 1919 enfranchisements,
the 1912 reform left the electoral law and the electoral district boundaries unchanged: as a conse-
quence the 1909 and 1913 elections happened under exactly the same conditions, the only di⁄erence
being the enfranchisement law. This is one of the most signi￿cant franchise extensions in Western
Europe. In most other countries enfranchisement was more gradual.4
The natural experiment relies on the fact that enfranchisement levels varied substantially across
the 508 single-member electoral districts. In the Sicilian district of Regalbuto, for example, the
registered voters increased from 2,145 to 16,704, an almost eightfold increase which transformed
1See also the discussion in section IV.C of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
2For a discussion of the limits of cross-country analysis for the study of institutions see Pande and Udry (2006).
3For a study on the consequences of the Second Reform Act see Berlinski and Dewan (2012), which uses an
approach similar to ours.
4In the UK, for example, there were three Reform Acts (1832, 1867, 1884) which gradually extended the franchise
before universal manhood su⁄rage was passed in 1918. In the years preceding the Italian reform the percentage of
enfranchised population aged twenty and above was 38.7 in Germany, 32.5 in Sweden, 28.8 in the UK and 43.4 in
France. In Italy it was only 15% and reached 42% with the reform (Flora, 1983).
2the previously enfranchised voters into a tiny minority. On the other side, district number two
of Milan saw an increase from 8,493 to 10,702 and the impact of the newly enfranchised on the
outcome must have necessarily been more modest. By exploiting this variation we can identify the
impact of franchise extension on a number of outcomes. Our main focus will be electoral results
and legislative representation.
By using the prevailing theories of electoral competition, political outcomes can, in turn, be
related to policy preferences and potential policy outcomes. We will focus on party a¢ liation and
family background as indicators of policy preferences.
Our analysis is motivated by the economic theories of democratization that have been proposed
in recent years. The common starting point of these hypotheses is an apparent historical puzzle. A
movement towards political equality gives higher political weight to people with policy preferences
which are likely to di⁄er from the preferences of previously enfranchised voters. In the case of
the Italian 1912 reform, for example, the su⁄rage was extended to illiterate and poor voters. This
must have changed the identity and policy preferences of the pivotal voter, therefore moving public
policy away from the preferences of the elite (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). This is a common
pattern in the Western world during the 19th century and the ￿rst decades of the 20th. So why
did the elite extend the franchise? According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006a), the elite
was forced to extend the franchise by revolutionary threats.5 In some speci￿c circumstances, often
triggered by economic crises, a revolution against the rich and propertied becomes possible. In
such cases redistribution to meet the economic demands of the population may not be su¢ cient to
appease the masses: an extension of the franchise works, in such cases, as a commitment device to
future redistribution. Revolutionary threats are more credible when the poor manage to overcome
collective action problems and organized labour is strong, which would explain why democratization
only happened during the 19th and 20th century, in spite of it being a feasible, and sometimes
demanded, institutional arrangement for a long time.
An alternative possibility is that franchise extension was granted as a consequence of an internal
con￿ ict within the elite (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Oxoby and Llavador 2005). While the urban
and industrial elites had an interest in the provision of public goods (particularly local public goods
like sanitation), the rural landlords were generally opposed to it. Enlarging the electorate makes
pork-barrel politics less attractive for politicians and public good provision a more e⁄ective way
to gain votes. Hence, by enfranchising larger segments of the population, non-swing elite groups,
and particularly the urban and industrial elites, were trying to move the equilibrium policy in the
direction of more public good provision and less patronage. Such elite groups gained the upper
hand gradually during the 19th century, which explains the gradual extension of the franchise that
occurred during that period.
Related to these theories is also the idea that democratization arrives as a consequence of
economic equality and capital mobility (Boix 2003), since both reduce the equilibrium tax rates
and reduce the opposition of elites to democratizing. Although this theory does not explain what
5A similar idea can be found in Conley and Temimi (2001).
3triggered democratization, it generates some clear predictions on the patterns that we should expect
in di⁄erent countries and in di⁄erent periods.
A key feature of both the external-con￿ ict and internal-con￿ ict hypotheses, as well as of Boix￿ s
theory, is that the newly and formerly enfranchised voters should have, on average, di⁄erent pref-
erences.6 It is this feature that generates revolutionary threats and the need for a commitment
device (in the external-con￿ ict approach), a policy change (in the internal-con￿ ict approach), and
the prominence of inequality and capital mobility.7
Consistently with economic theories of democratization, our empirical analysis shows that en-
franchisement caused an increase in the vote share of social reformers. It is likely that this increase
was due to a non-negligible di⁄erence between the voting choices of the formerly and newly en-
franchised voters. One standard deviation in enfranchisement led to an average 2% increase in
the vote for social reformers. At the same time, however, franchise extension had no e⁄ect (and
possibly a negative e⁄ect) on the legislative representation of these same social reformers, on the
competitiveness of elections and on the chances to observe a social reformer as a candidate. It is
also quite remarkable that such a massive expansion in franchise had no impact on the legislative
representation of aristocrats and other members of the traditional elites. Our analysis also shows
that enfranchisement damaged social reformers in the more unequal districts, which is the oppo-
site of what we would expect if voting mechanically re￿ ected economic interests Æ la Meltzer and
Richard.
One possible interpretation of these results is that when, for whatever reason, the elite decides
to democratize, it still manages to exercise a substantial e⁄ort to minimize the political impact
of the newly enfranchised. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b), for example, discuss how ￿captured
democracies￿can emerge because the newly created institutions maintain an advantage for elite
groups.8 In particular, elites￿e⁄orts to neutralize democracy should be expected if democratization
arrives as a consequence of an intra-elite con￿ ict: it is reasonable for the part of the elite whose
interests are threatened by democracy to use its de facto power to minimize the consequences
of institutional reforms. Hence, there is no mechanical correspondence between de jure political
equality and de facto empowerment of individuals.
The paper will document and analyse elites￿e⁄orts to minimize the consequences of the 1912
reform by providing evidence on the e⁄ects of a secret pact (the Gentiloni pact) and by documenting
6I refer to ￿preferences￿here not in the sense of a primitive of an economic model. Di⁄erent policy preferences can
be derived from the same primitive preferences but di⁄erent endowments, in which case they indicate an economic
con￿ ict rather than di⁄erent intrinsic predispositions.
7The literature on the determinants of democratization is vast: here I only discuss the theories that are most
closely related to the subsequent empirical investigation and that I call ￿economic theories of democratization￿ .
Another prominent hypothesis, which goes under the label of ￿modernization theory￿(Lipset, 1959), posits that
economic development and political development move in parallel since, for various reasons, markets have better
chances to prosper under democratic regimes. This theory lacks microfoundations and, as stressed by Rueschemeyer,
Stephens and Stephens (1992), it does not specify clear causality links. On empirical grounds, the modernization
hypothesis has been criticized by Acemoglu et al. (2009).
8One example is the presence of a non-elected chamber, like in the UK or in Italy, or an extremely malapportioned
one like in the USA.
4how social reformers increased their vote shares where votes were less useful and were instead
systematically defeated in key swing districts.
The interpretation of these results rests ultimately on which model of electoral competition
we think is best at representing what happened. It is of key importance whether we believe
candidates were able to commit to their platforms or not: the assumption that politicians can fully
pre-commit to their announcend platforms plays a crucial role in models of electoral competition
(Calvert 1985, Alesina 1988). In a Downsian context, policy change can be achieved without much
political change. If the Italian elections of 1909 and 1913 happened in a Downsian world then it
would not be surprising to ￿nd little impact of enfranchisement on political outcomes.
In theoretical terms, models that remove the full commitment assumption tend to stress the
role of credibility and personal identity and, therefore, the importance of political selection.9 In
empirical terms, a number of recent papers show that parties and the personal identity of elected
representatives generally matter for implemented policies.10 This let us presume that the political
a¢ liation and personal characteristics of elected representatives had some policy relevance at the
time of the Italian democratization, suggesting that our ￿ndings can be related to both the political
and policy consequences of enfranchisement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the historical and institutional
background, presents the main political actors and discusses the process and possible motivations
that led to the franchise extension. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy and the data. Section
4 presents our main empirical results and some robustness checks. Section 5 asks why the reform
had so little impact on representation is spite of its e⁄ects on vote shares. Section 6 concludes
discussing how our results relate to economic theories of democratization and to the ￿ndings of
previous empirical research on enfranchisement.
2 Historical background
2.1 The political landscape
The years between 1901 and 1914 are politically dominated by Giovanni Giolitti, to the point that
historians commonly refer to them as the ￿Giolitti era￿ . He was the Prime Minister when the
electoral reform was introduced. Moderately progressive and close to the emerging industrial elite,
Giolitti rejected the repressive policies that had characterised the governments of the last years of
the 19th century. By refusing to use the military and the police to repress organized labour during
disputes with employers, one of his main purposes was to establish a modern system of industrial
relations. Giolitti￿ s years were characterised by a substantial increase in real wages, particularly
9These include the models of representative democracy (better known as citizen-candidate model) of Osborne
and Slivinsky (1994) and Besley and Coate (1995).
10Among others, Besley and Case (2003), Lee et al. (2004), Petterson-Libdom (2008) provide evidence of a partisan
impact on public policy (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009, however, ￿nd no impact in the case of US municipalities).
Pande (2003), Chattopadhyay and Du￿ o (2004), Clots-Figueras (2010) provide evidence on the policy impact of the
personal identity of elected representatives.
5in the industrial sector, possibly as a consequence of the increased bargaining power of unions
(Zamagni 1984; Gentile, 2003).
2.1.1 The Estrema
The main focus of our attention are the parties with a programme of radical social and institutional
reform, since, according to economic theories of democratization, they should be the main bene￿-
ciaries of universal su⁄rage. These parties were the Radical, the Republican and the Socialist, often
refereed to as the ￿Estrema￿ , because they were located at the extreme (although often moderate)
left of the ideological spectrum. A ￿rst important distinction between these parties and the others
was that, unlike other groups and factions, they were organized as parties in a modern sense. They
held regular congresses, had a party organization, a party manifesto and an elected leadership.11
Although coming from di⁄erent histories and traditions, these parties advocated policies that, to a
certain extent, were similar. They shared a demand for both economic12 and democratic reforms.13
Candidates of the Estrema often formed alliances for local elections, sometimes with good results.
A remarkable case was the alliance in the municipal election of Rome, where the Radical Ernesto
Nathan was elected mayor in 1907 with the support of the Republicans and the Socialists.
Nevertheless, parliamentary elections were always local a⁄airs. There was never a formal na-
tional alliance between the parties of the Estrema, although they would sometimes support each
other on a local basis. Alliances in run-o⁄ elections were also quite common although, again, not
to be taken for granted.14
These parties remained mostly moderate and reformist during the Giolitti era. By 1904 the
Radical Party had recognized the legitimacy of the Monarchy and had declared itself available
for a government that would accept their democratic and progressive agenda. From 1906 most
Radicals openly supported Giolitti, although this ambiguous and unstable relationship came to an
end when Giolitti became closer to the Catholics.15 Giolitti also tried, unsuccessfully, to attract
in the government area the most moderate MPs of the Socialist party. The Italian Socialist party
(PSI) was crossed by profound divisions between its reformist and revolutionary components. With
the exception of the period 1904-06, the PSI remained a reformist party, willing to negotiate with
the government and sometimes supporting its reforms. A radical change occurred in 1912, when
the revolutionaries took control of the party and the most moderate members (not the entire
11￿In Italy only the Republicans, the Radicals and the Socialists can be called parties. They have a programme,
distinct from the programme of other parties, and they are kept together by the purpose of implementing that pro-
gramme. The programmes of the various constitutional groups, instead, are not clear (...) More than political
parties (...) these can be called factions￿(Duca di Gualtieri 1910: Necessita￿di una ricostituzione dei partiti politici,
Rassegna Nazionale, 31-171, p.133. My translation from Piretti, 1990, p. 107).
12Demands of an improvement in the economic conditions of the working classes were particularly important for
the Socialist Party and, to a certain extent, were shared by the other two.
13These included universal su⁄rage, an elected upper chamber (Senators were appointed by the government) and
the replacement of Monarchy with Republic.
14Competition between parties of the Estrema was also not uncommon, especially in the ￿rst round. The district
of Grosseto, for example, in the 1909 election had a three-horse race between a Socialist, a Republican and a Radical.
15Radicals always mantained a distinct anti-clerical position. Their candidates were often drawn from Freema-
sonry.
6reformist group) were espelled. Hence, in the 1913 election we have an o¢ cial Socialist Party
(controlled by the revolutionaries) and a Reformist Socialist Party, as well as some independent
Socialist candidates that did not belong to either.
2.1.2 The Constitutionals
As it was typical at the time, Giolitti managed to maintain a ￿rm control of Parliament, but had
neither a party nor a stable majority. As a matter of fact, there was no proper party organization
in the dominant ￿Constitutional￿camp. The vast majority of MPs elected to the Camera dei
Deputati, were generally called ￿Liberals￿ , but this was only a generic reference to their prevailing
ideology: there was no Liberal party and no Liberal electoral manifesto.16 There were instead
factions, groups created around personal networks and the phenomenon of ￿trasformismo￿ , ￿a
system of political clientelism based on the formation of ad hoc parliamentary groups that mo-
nopolized political o¢ ce by using patronage and fraudulent elections to ensure electoral success￿.17
Parliamentary coalitions were, therefore, unstable and lacked a clear political identity.18
Constitutional (or liberal) MPs would generally be divided in ￿Ministerial￿and ￿Opposition￿
on the basis of whether they supported the government or not. All Constitutionals, however,
accepted the current institutional arrangements and recognized the authority of the Monarchy.
Whether conservative or moderately progressive, they had a perception of themselves as the ruling
elite, the only people that could possibly govern the country.
2.1.3 The Catholics
Most Constitutionals, including a large part of the most conservative factions, remained, still in the
early 20th century, against any compromise with the clericals. Italy had been uni￿ed half a century
earlier at the expenses of, among others, the Catholic state. The Vatican had never recognized
Italy and still maintained the non expedit, the prohibition for Catholics to participate in public
life. In the early 20th century, however, things began to change. Although the non expedit was
mantained, local bishops could ask for a dispensation, usually on the ground that the Catholic
vote was necessary to prevent the election of ￿subversive￿candidates. The ￿rst few dispensations
were granted in the region of Lombardy in 1904. There were a few dispensations again in 1909.
Given that there was no o¢ cial party a¢ liation for candidates or MPs, the presence of Catholic
MPs in parliament did not embarass the Vatican, which remained against the creation of an o¢ cial
Catholic party, in spite of pressures coming from some in￿ uential activists. In the election on
16There is nothing in Italian political history that parallels the development of a liberal and a conservative party
like in the UK, and ￿liberal￿here includes both progressives and conservatives.
17Collier (1999), p. 70. To understand the pervasiveness of trasformismo in Italian politics it su¢ ces to note
that, during a brief period in which multimember districts and list voting were introduced (1882-1892), it was not
unusual to ￿nd the same candidate in more than one list in the same district.
18The Liberal-constitutionals included conservatives like Sonnino and Salandra and moderate progressives like
Giolitti. Positions, however, were always far from clear-cut and, considering their standing on a number of issues,
it is di¢ cult to draw clear lines within the constitutional camp.
71913 this process of uno¢ cial entry of Catholics in Italian politics led to a secret alliance (known
as ￿Gentiloni pact￿) between the Catholic Electoral Association and Giolitti: non expedit was
suspended in about half the electoral districts. The 228 candidates that signed the secret Patto
were mostly Giolitti￿ s men, who committed to a number of pro-Catholic policies (regarding family
and moral values, schools, Catholic education etc.).
2.2 The electoral reform
On March 18, 1911, during a parliamentary debate on a timid proposal of electoral reform,19 Giolitti
gave a landmark speech, declaring to ￿believe that today an enlargement of the franchise cannot be
postponed any longer. Twenty years after the last electoral reform, a big revolution has happened
in Italy, which has produced a vast progress in the economic, intellectual and moral condition of
the popular classes (...) I don￿ t think that an exam on how easily a man can use the 24 letters of
the alphabet should decide if he has the attitude to evaluate the big issues that interest the popular
classes￿ .20 By expressing his favour to an extension of the franchise to the illiterate, Giolitti was
making a U-turn compared to what he had declared in Parliament only two years earlier: ￿I believe
that we need to have universal su⁄rage but by a di⁄erent mean: by teaching to everybody how to
write and read￿ .21 In the words of the socialist Gaetano Salvemini, Giolitti was serving ￿lunch at
8am￿ . After this unexpected turn in the parliamentary debate, the Luzzatti government resigned
and Giolitti was called by the King to form a new government, the fourth of his political career.
The electoral reform was, therefore, the central point in the programme of the fourth Giolitti
government.
The reform, strongly wanted by Giolitti and his ministerial group, was proposed in June 1911.
The key points of the proposal were the extension of the franchise and the payment of MPs.22
The last franchise extension, passed in 1882, granted the voting right on the basis of ￿capability￿ ,
which was in turn identi￿ed with literacy and census criteria.23 Giolitti￿ s proposal maintained
19The proposal of Prime Minister Luzzatti would have had only a limited impact on franchise but included other
important institutional reforms: for example, it would have transformed the Upper Chamber, the Senate, into a
partially elected body.
20Camera dei deputati, Atti Parlamentari, Discussioni, legislatura XXIII, 18 Marzo 1911, pp. 13549-13554. My
translation from Ballini (2007), p.149.
21My translation from Piretti (2001), p. 552.
22￿I would like direct representatives of the popular classes to enter parliament and I prefer these direct represen-
tatives to those who are only their advocates￿(Giolitti, parliamentary speech of June 27, 1911. My translation from
Piretti, 1995).
23According to the 1882 law, only literate males aged at least 21 could be included in the electoral registers. In
addition, they needed to satisfy at least another criterion from a given list. The most important criteria in the
list were: (a) to have a minimum of formal education (a two-year certi￿cate); (b) to pay at least 19.80 liras of
income tax; (c) other criteria mainly consisting of owning or renting an accommodation of a minimum size (the
exact number of square meters depended on the town population). An income tax payment of 19.80 liras was easily
reached by most workers in urban areas. According to estimates by Zamagni (1984), the average industrial salary
in 1911 was 2.67 liras per day. The income tax rate was 8%. The literacy criterion could be satis￿ed in two ways:
either with a title of second year primary school (which was then su¢ cient to obtain the electorate) or by writing
an application in front of a public o¢ cial.
8the capability criterion and therefore did not recognize voting as a citizenship right.24 Historians
refer to this reform as ￿quasi-universal￿su⁄rage. In practice, it granted universal male su⁄rage
to the over 30s, while keeping the 1882 restrictions only for the population between 21 and 30.25
The voting right was also granted to anyone above 21 that had served in the army. Since the tax
payment threshold was already set at a rather low level, the main consequence of the reform was
to extend the franchise to the illiterate.26
In spite of the many critiques received in parliament and outside (either because it was ￿a jump
in the dark￿ 27 or because it was still too little), in the ￿nal secret vote on May 25, 1912, the 346
present MPs were mostly favourable (284 voted in favour, 62 against). On June 29 the Senate,
whose life-time members were appointed by the government, approved the law with 131 votes in
favour and 40 against.
Very few MPs spoke in parliament against the reform. Even the leader of the conservative
opposition, Sidney Sonnino, had in fact always been an advocate of universal su⁄rage: ￿It is only
from universal su⁄rage that the government can achieve the strength to represent and protect the
general interest, which is continuously endangered by the particular interests of individuals, localities
and small and egoistic groups￿ .28 During the parliamentary debate Sonnino declared himself in
favour of an even more radical reform, that could have included the women. He supported Giolitti￿ s
proposal on the ground that it was a move in the right direction. Not all conservatives agreed. A
noteworthy exception was the MP and sociologist Gaetano Mosca, according to whom the inclusion
of millions of illiterates could ￿not increase the capacity of the electoral body to understand the big
issues of national politics￿ .29
The reform was received with extreme favour by the Catholics in parliament, who proposed
an extension to all adult males. The Catholic Filippo Meda, during the parliamentary debate,
declared himself in favour of compulsory voting, although no such amendment was proposed.
24￿The electorate is undeniably a fundamental function of the State, but only those that have been proved to have
su¢ cient capacity to accomplish this very delicate function can have the right to exercise it￿(Giolitti, parliamentary
speech of May 9, 1912. My translation from Piretti, 1995, p. 175).
25This age restriction was based on the ground that life experiences generate the capacity to evaluate political
matters. When such experience was not su¢ cient (i.e. age was below 30), then this capacity had to be demostrated
through literacy and census.
26The parliamentary committee in charge of the reform was ￿rmly in the hands of Giolitti￿ s ￿ministerials￿ , but
the proposal was passed not without amendments. The main amendment regarded the creation of an o¢ cial ballot
paper. Until then, there was no o¢ cial ballot paper, there was no list of candidates and no need to o¢ cially declare
candidacy. Voters would simply write the name of their preferred candidate on a piece of paper. To ensure that
a person that cannot read and write could vote, Giolitti proposed the creation of an o¢ cial ballot paper with pre-
printed names: voters would then be required to cross the name of their preferred candidate. This required that
candidates had to o¢ cially propose themselves a few days in advance of the election day. This proposal was rejected
by the committee, that did not like the idea of putting restrictions of any sort on candidacy. Instead, to ensure that
illiterate voters could exercise their right, they had the possibility to bring a pre-written paper from home. This
would then be inserted in an o¢ cial envelope and sealed to guarantee secrecy.
27￿This is an enormous jump in the dark.(...). Thirthy-one out of sixty-nine provinces, containing 215 districts,
will have a majority of illerate voters￿. Corriere della Sera, May 4, 1912. My translation.
28S. Sonnino, ￿Il partito liberale e il su⁄ragio universale￿ , Nuova Antologia, s. 5, vol. 239, pp. 305-314. My
translation from Ballini (2007), p.164.
29Gaetano Mosca, parliamentary speech of May 9, 1912. My translation from Ballini (2007), p. 172.
9The public debate seemed to assume that the extremists would have bene￿ted from the reform.
Not all commentators agreed on this point: ￿The prevailing opinion is that the reform will damage
the consitutional liberal party and bene￿t the extreme parties. It is widely believed that - with some
exceptions - the bene￿ciaries will be the extreme parties in the urban areas and the conservative
and reactionary parties in the rural areas. (...) There are in Italy around 80 prevailingly urban
electoral districts and 428 rural districts. If the prediction will be correct then the conservatives
and reactionaries will prevail￿ 30 This might be a reason why the parties of the Estrema did not
display much enthusiasm for the lunch at 8am, in spite of having demanded universal su⁄rage
for some time. The PSI o¢ cial newspaper ￿L￿ Avanti!￿ commented: ￿democratic progress is not
only and always obtained by extending political rights. The bourgeoisie easily concedes freedom and
voting rights, but they know other ways to keep intact their economic tyranny, while they concede
more economic reforms in favour of the masses when they have a ￿rm grip on the monopoly of
political power￿ 31 Floor debates show that MPs of the Estrema generally espressed a view that
every adult male should have been enfranchised. Some, like the Radical Giulio Alessio, expressed
their concern that universal su⁄rage could create the conditions for ￿conservative forces to prevail
in future national representations￿and for a halt to the ￿reformist policies so strictly linked to the
future of our country￿ .32 Republican MP Mirabelli proposed an amendment to extend the voting
rights to the women, which encountered the favour of most speakers of the Estrema (and of the
conservative leader Sonnino), but was defeated by large majority (209 against, 48 in favour).
As the previous numbers show, attendance and voting during parliamentary debate was gen-
erally not high. The Socialists were particularly absent from the debate, to the point that their
leader Filippo Turati, explicitly felt the need to defend their lack of participation on the ground
that ￿the new law has all the signs (...) of a bene￿t which has not been conquered, but imposed
and to which our part could not impress any of our characteristics￿ .33 This could have been just
a tactic, to avoid conceding any merit to Giolitti for the reform. More likely, however, it re￿ ected
a real dilemma and a debate that had been going on inside the party for over a decade. For the
dominant reformist faction ￿universal su⁄rage is (...), like for any other democratic, the foundation
of true popular sovereignity￿but ￿the franchise in itself is an instrument, and without a force that
knows how to use it, it can damage precisely those that demand it￿34. For advocates of universal
su⁄rage, on the other side, ￿it opens the ￿eld to the competition of all interests and of all parties.
Disenfranchising a part of the population means that political parties will not normally be interested
in the needs of the excluded; and that a big cause of political education is suppressed, since the many
excluded from the voting rights will not ￿nd anybody interested in mobilizing them￿ .35 This debate
30￿Su⁄ragio universale e analfabetismo￿ , Nuova Antologia, 46, 237, p. 335. My translation from Piretti (1990),
114-115.
31L￿ Avanti!, May 9, 1912. My translation from Ballini (2007), p. 175.
32Parliamentary speech of Radical MP Giulio Alessio, May 4, 1912. My translation from Ballini (2007), p. 176.
33￿Il su⁄ragio colla museruola￿ , Critica Sociale, XXII, n. 10-11, pp. 145-146, May 1912. My translation from
Ballini (2007), p. 176.
34Bonomi (1905), p.341. My translation.
35Salvemini (1905), p.371. My translation.
10also re￿ ected the fact that the moderate leadership was concentrated in the North, where blue
collar workers were sometimes already enfranchised, and was generally suspicious about the real
attitudes of the Southern disenfranchised.36
2.3 Why did Giolitti extend the franchise?
Universal su⁄rage arrived in Italy in a manner which was not di⁄erent from the rest of Europe: as
a concession from the elite. As for similar instances across Europe, historians have speculated for
decades about the motivations that induced Giolitti to pass the reform. In this section I will make
an attempt to link the hypotheses made by historians on this speci￿c event to more general ideas
about democratization.
One of the most in￿ uential theories on democratization is that it emerges from the struggle
between elites and non-elites, when the last are in a position to make a credible revolutionary
threat (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). In the case of the Italian 1912 reform, a number of factors
seem to indicate that revolutionary pressure was low, and certainly lower than in previous years.
All the parties of the Estrema were controlled by relatively moderate leaderships and one party, the
Radical, had three ministerial positions in the Giolitti government. Social con￿ ict was relatively low
if compared with previous years. Figure 2 shows the number of strikes and the number of recorded
participants in strikes per year, both in industry and in agriculture. The red line corresponds to
1911, when Giolitti proposed the reform. The ￿gure shows that social con￿ ict was in line with,
and possibly lower than, the physiological levels it had mantained since 1900. From an economic
standpoint, Italy￿ s estimated average annual GDP growth rate between 1907 and 1913 was 1.8%,
smaller than the 3.4% of the period 1899-1907. Average annual growth rate of salaries between 1901
and 1911 was 2.5%, in a context of rapid industrialization and good order in the public ￿nances
(Toniolo, 1988). In brief, it appears unlikely that the reform was triggered either by an economic
crisis or by the threat of a revolution.37
Some historians, however, believe that Giolitti was entirely conscious of the risks associated
with a massive su⁄rage extension, but was convinced that it was inevitable. Hence, he considered
that it would have been better for the liberals to guide the process rather than to be perceived as
forced to concede it.38 In this sense it might have been a pre-emptive move against the Socialists,
whom sooner or later were expected to launch a campaign for universal su⁄rage. Also, by control-
ling the process of the franchise extension, Giolitti could make sure that quasi-universal su⁄rage
36Everyone in the PSI, instead, agreed on the need to move to proportional representation. The ￿rst, obvious
reason, was that electoral boundaries had remained unchanged since 1892. At a time of rapid urban development,
this had led to a situation where some districts could be several times larger than others. Typically, urban areas
and rapidly industrializing areas were underrepresented and these were precisely the areas were the Socialists were
stronger and growing faster. Second, the Socialists felt that proportional representation would move the focus of
attention from individuals to programmes and that they could bene￿t from a more party-centered politics.
37Giolitti himself appears to avail this conclusion when declaring that ￿the big reforms must be proposed when the
time is ripe, when the Country is calm￿ (My translation from Ballini, 2007).
38Gentile (2003).
11was implemented keeping everything else constant. Indeed, there were no revisions in the district
boundaries and, more importantly, there was no concession in the direction of a more proportional
representation: both would have given the Estrema a tangible increase in seats. This interpreta-
tion is compatible with the party-competiton hypothesis, according to which democratization was
essentially driven by short term political considerations.39 It is, however, also compatible with the
idea, also advanced by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b), that, when conceding voting rights, elites
try to retain or introduce institutional features that minimize the impact of democratization and
their loss of political in￿ uence.
With respect to the theory of Lizzeri and Persico (2004), discussed in the Introduction, some
historians stress that the reform could have emerged from Giolitti￿ s desire to stabilize his majority
by enlarging it to the left. It was di¢ cult for Giolitti to fully implement a moderately progressive
agenda in a predominantly conservative parliament. He had made repeated attempts to absorb
parts of the Estrema into the government. He succeded with most Radicals but not with the
Socialists, even the most moderate. Expanding the electorate could have, therefore, represented
an attempt to stabilize his majority to the left, in a context in which the Estrema was su¢ ciently
moderate and the Socialists were led by the reformist faction. This amounted, in Giolitti￿ s view,
to a strategic alliance aimed at modernizing the country between the most progressive components
of the elite and the emerging organized working classes (Montaldo, 2001).
Recent theoretical developments also link democratization to the presence of war and the need
for mass-mobilization.40 This hypothesis ￿ts well with immediate speculations made at the time
about a possible link between the electoral reform and the war for the colonization of Libya.41 ￿With
that concession, Giolitti wanted to secure the support of the reformist Socialists to the conquest of
Libya￿ ,42 or at least to appease the anti-militarists in the Estrema (while the war in Libya could
be regarded as a concession to the nationalists and the Catholics).43 As a matter of fact, some
reformists and, for di⁄erent reasons, even some revolutionaries in the Socialist Party supported the
war. The Libyan war was declared in September 1911, a few months after Giolitti￿ s electoral reform
proposal and, although Libya￿ s annexation to the Italian Kingdom was declared in November 1911,
the war was o¢ cially concluded only in October 1912. Hence, when the proposal was debated and
voted in parliament, Italy was still at war with Turkey over Libya, which gave another argument to
pass the law: ￿they have conquered￿their right to vote ￿in the Tripoli battle￿elds; no-one asked then
Southern peasants whether they were illiterate or not￿ .44 This interpretation of the 1912 reform,
however, appears to have lost credit among historians.45
Finally, according to the so-called enlightenment hypothesis, democratization was driven es-
39See the discussion of this approach contained in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
40Scheve and Stasavage (2010), Vindigni and Ticchi (2008).
41Carocci (1961).
42Salvemini (1955). My translation.
43The Vatican had important economic interests in Libya that felt were not adequately guaranteed by the Turkish
government.
44Sidney Sonnino, my translation from Ballini (2007).
45See Montaldo (2001).
12sentially by the fact that the values of the elite were changing.46 Historical evidence shows that
Giolitti genuinely believed in a stronger and more representative parliament; he had passed other
reforms that had reinforced the Deputy Chamber47 and this was just another step in a process
of institutional modernization that Giolitti was con￿dent to keep under his control.48 Whether
this was the consequence of changing values or, rather, of strategic considerations remains a moot
point and hard to establish. It is useful peraphs to remember that Giolitti￿ s opinion change on
universal su⁄rage was quite sudden, as proven by parliamentary records49, a fact which makes the
enlightenment hypothesis less plausible.
To sum up, although it is certain that the reform was desired mainly by Giolitti and his
supporters, the motives that induced such a sudden and unexpected turn remain still debated
today. Without pretending to provide de￿nite answers, this section has highlighted the main links
between a consolidated historical research and some in￿ uential hypotheses on democratization
advanced by scholars in recent years. I will return again on the possible motives that led to
democratization in the conclusions, where the issue will be reconsidered also on the basis of the
evidence provided in this paper.
3 Research design and data
3.1 Empirical strategy
Our identi￿cation strategy is based on comparing the 1913 election (the ￿rst post-reform) with the
1909 (the last pre-reform) election. The intensity of the treatment for an electoral district is repre-
sented by the magnitude of newly enfranchised population compared to the formerly enfranchised.
This tries to approximate an experiment in which we compare the actual outcomes of the 1913
election with the outcomes that would have occurred without the reform. To be more precise, if
we indicate with S13
i the Estrema share of vote (or any other outcome of interest) in district i in




















i are, respectively, the number of citizens in district i that would have been
enfranchised in 1913 under the old electoral rule, while E13
i is the actual number of enfranchised
citizens in 1913. ￿P and ￿N then represent the propensity to vote Estrema among, respectively,
the formerly and newly enfranchised citizens. ￿13 is an e⁄ect which is common to all electoral
districts in 1913 and e13
i is a district-speci￿c error. EP
i is unobservable but we can approximate it
46See the discussion of this hypothesis in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
47He had increased the discretion of parliament in regulating its internal organization and had instituted the
explicit vote of con￿dence at the beginning of a new government. Until then, there was presumption of con￿dence
unless a con￿dence vote was called and lost by the executive.
48See Ullrich (1979) and De Felice (1980).
49He had publicly opposed universal su⁄rage only two years before proposing the reform.
13with E09
i ; the actual number of registered voters in 1909, under the assumption that exit (voters
that died or moved elsewhere) and entry (voters that met the capacity condition or moved in) in
EP
i balance each other.
If we assume that the average propensities ￿P and ￿N are constant (after taking into account
the time-speci￿c e⁄ects ￿t), at least in the short time span we consider, then we can write a similar
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We are ignoring here possible di⁄erences in turnout rates across the two group of voters: ￿P and
￿N bypass that stage and represent the overall reduced-form propensity to vote Estrema (where
the alternatives are both voting for other parties and not voting). By subtracting (1) from (2) we


















which can be written as







This speci￿cation allows us to recover the di⁄erence in the propensity to vote Estrema among the
two group of voters. This is a di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences speci￿cation with a continuous treatment
variable and it is equivalent to a ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation since by di⁄erencing we remove unob-
served ￿xed characteristics of the electoral districts. Like for all natural experiments of this sort
we need to worry about changing rather than ￿xed characteristics. To address these concerns we
will use control variables, province speci￿c shocks and previous changes in the dependent variables.
Regressions using placebo treatments will help us to understand what is the impact of pre-existing
trends on our results.
The assumption that E09
i = EP
i represents a reasonable approximation since the time span
considered is short. The variable EP
i ; however, is measured with an error that, even if randomly
distributed, could bias our results downwards. Also, we cannot rule out the existence of a correlation
between (E09
i ￿ EP
i ) and (e13
i ￿ e09
i ). For example, districts with higher immigration could have
better organized labour organizations and therefore experience larger increases in Estrema vote.
One of the control variables employed, population change between 1901 and 1911, should at least
partially deal with the possible bias that could result from this possibility. Controlling for changes
in male literacy rates also helps us to better approximate what would have happened under the
previous law that restricted the franchise mainly on literacy grounds.
50This assumption ignores the possibility of strategic voting and, more generally, possible reactions of the formerly
enfranchised to the new political situation.
143.2 Data description
Between 1892 and 1913 Italy had 508 single-member electoral districts with a two-round majority
system. District boundaries remained unchanged along the entire period and, since there was no
Census in 1891, were based on 1881 population data. Registration data and electoral results for the
elections occurred between 1904 and 1913 were collected from the Parliamentary Archive in Rome
(Archivio Storico della Camera dei Deputati). Since candidacy was individual and there was no
o¢ cial a¢ liation with political parties, the Archive only contains the number of votes obtained by
each candidate but does not provide information on political a¢ liations. The matching between
names and political parties has been possible thanks to currently still unpublished information
collected by Maria Serena Piretti from newspaper articles of the period. This information has
allowed me to reconstruct the vote share by party and by electoral district in the 1904-1913 elections.
Table 1 reports information on the number of candidates, votes (in the ￿rst round election) and
seats for the three elections. We will use the vote percentage of Estrema candidates in the ￿rst
round as one of our dependent variables.
Biographical information on members of parliament was collected from the three volumes of
Malatesta (1940). This is a collection of short biographies of all Italian MPs from 1861 to 1924.
We will use information regarding the social and economic background of the MPs: whether the
MP is an aristocrat, a big landowner, a high-ranked military or a diplomat. These groups were
generally very close to the Monarchy and represented the traditional (and often most conservative)
elites. To this we also add information on whether the MP is a member of a political dynasty,
which signals belonging to an established in￿ uential family. How good are these variables to
capture the distinction between traditional as opposed to emerging elites? Aristocracy status can
be determined with very high precision: the name reported by Malatesta (1940) gives nobility
titles and is su¢ cient to identify whether the MP is an aristocrat or not. The other characteristics
might have been underreported in the biographies, generating the possibility of false negatives in
our dataset. Although measurement error cannot be ruled out, these characteristics have a strong
positive association, which renders the number of false negatives probably quite small. Table 2
reports aggregate numbers of aristocrat and traditional elite members for the period 1904-1913.
Data on the socio-economic characteristics of electoral districts have been reconstructed using
the 1901 and 1911 Censuses. I use both the 1901-1911 changes and 1911 levels of the following
variables: total population in the districts, percentage (over the total population) of employees in
industrial sectors, percentage of landless agricultural workers, percentage of agricultural workers
cultivating their own land, percentage of the population which owns real estate, percentage of male
classi￿ed as illiterate (over total male population aged six and above). For 1911 only I could also
reconstruct the percentage of the population living in urban areas: this variable is thefore only
introduced as a 1911 level.51 Further details and information on other variables are provided in
51Population data are available at town level in both 1901 and 1911 and can therefore be easily aggregated
at the electoral district level. Literacy is also available at town level in 1911. For all other variables, the most
detailed territorial level for which they are available is the circondario. The Italian territory was divided into 206
15the Sections where the variables are used.
3.3 Correlates of enfranchisement
Figure 3 reports the distributions of registered voters by electoral district in 1909 and 1913. Figure 4





i (from now on ￿E): Figure 5 plots
￿E over male illiteracy rate in 1911. Not surprisingly we observe a strong positive correlation, since
literacy was the most di⁄use obstacle to registration before the reform. The correlation coe¢ cient
is 0.74. The graph also indicates whether the district was from the North-West (NW), North-East
(NE), Center (C) or South (S), showing how illiteracy was strongly correlated with latitude.52
An OLS regression of ￿E over male illiteracy rates (column 1 in table 3) shows that 55% of the
variation in enfranchisement can be explained by literacy alone. Figure 5 also shows that, while at
high levels of illiteracy ￿E is always high, there is a substantial dispersion of ￿E at low levels of
illiteracy. Literacy was a su¢ cient condition for enfranchisement only if accompanied by a formal
certi￿cate of two-year primary education. Hence, one possibility is that many literates, especially
in the North-West, did not possess a formal certi￿cate and did not satisfy other census criteria.53
Another possibility is that, since illiteracy information refers to the overall population above six,
the discrepancy could capture di⁄erent trends in literacy across districts (since younger cohorts
were probably more educated). We will return again on this issue at a later stage in the robustness
checks section.
Column 2 in Table 3 provides other correlations. ￿E appears to have been smaller in urban
districts and where the percentage of industrial workers was higher but also, controlling for other
covariates, in areas with a higher share of agricultural workers that did not own their own land.
￿E is also higher in districts with a larger male population and in districts with higher population
growth. Columns 3 and 4 use ￿Et￿1 as dependent variable. They show that changes in enfran-
chisement between 1904 and 1909 (i.e. under the pre-reform law) were still positively correlated
with the size of a district (overall population) and with population changes but not with any of the
other district characteristics. Moreover, enfranchisement between 1904 and 1909 grew faster in dis-
tricts with lower illiteracy rates, which is what we should expect given the rules. Table 3 suggests
that the reform of 1912 represented a shock compared to previous trends in our main treatment
variable and that franchise extension across the electoral districts was substantially di⁄erent from
circondario for Census purposes (this was not an administrative unit). Of 508 electoral districts, 318 were entirely
contained within a single circondario and the circondario variables have been used. In the remaining 190 cases I
have estimated the electoral district variable by using weighted circondario data, with weights given by town-level
population data. This approximation is plausible since between circondario variation is almost certainly larger than
within circondario variation. For illiteracy percentage, for example, which is available at the town level, the within
circondario standar error is 7.9 while the corresponding between circondario measure is 17.9. This is, in any event,
the only route to recover a number of social and economic indicators at the electoral district level. To my knowledge
this is the ￿rst dataset that provides detailed socio-economic variables by electoral districts for that period.
52See Table A.1 for a de￿nition of these variables.
53In this case, di⁄erentials in franchise extension in 1909 for given literacy rates could, at least in part, re￿ ect
di⁄erent income levels, since a formal education certi￿cate was not required if the citizen satis￿ed the census
requirements.
16what could have been expected to be under the previous law.
An important question is whether ￿E is correlated with the political orientations of the districts.
Columns 5 and 6 of table 3 report regressions of ￿E over previous electoral vote shares of the
Estrema. The results show that ￿E was higher in districts with historically weaker Estrema, as
con￿rmed by columns 7-8 that replicate the same regressions using the 1904 Estrema electoral vote
shares. These results persist, with slightly smaller magnitudes, if we control for male illiteracy rate
in 1911 (not reported). These regressions show that franchise extension was not idiosyncratic with
respect to the existing pre-reform strength of the Estrema. Although not surprising (the Estrema
was stronger where a larger share of the working classes were already enfranchised), they suggest
that simple OLS regressions would deliver biased coe¢ cients. A di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences approach
removes ￿xed characteristics of electoral districts (including previous Estrema electoral strength).
Our results could be biased if districts with di⁄erent pre-existing Estrema strength were trending
di⁄erently, a concern that will be addressed in various ways during the empirical analysis.
Figure 6 correlates ￿E with changes in the vote share of Estrema candidates between 1909 and
1913. The graph suggests that districts that experienced a larger enfranchisement also witnessed
a larger variation in the votes given to reformers. However this variation is not always positive
and cases of increases as well as decreases of vote shares seem equally likely. Although it would be
premature to jump to conclusions, this graph suggests that average e⁄ects on the share of votes
for social reformers could hide a substantial heterogeneity. The graph also shows that there is no
obvious correlation between gains/losses of Estrema and the location of a district in one of the four
geographic areas.
4 The political impact of the 1912 reform
4.1 Baseline estimates
Vote share
Table 4 reports results when the dependent variable of equation 4 is the share of votes received
by candidates of the Estrema. Column (1) is a simple OLS regression with no controls and shows
a strong correlation between enfranchisement and the change in vote percentage of Estrema candi-
dates. Although no other covariate is included, by focussing on di⁄erences this speci￿cation takes
into account ￿xed unobserved characteristics of the electoral districts. The constant represents a
￿xed 1913 time e⁄ect and is therefore the (constant across districts) di⁄erence between 1913 and
1909. In column (2) I include the 1901-1911 di⁄erences in the control variables. This is equivalent
to a ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation with control variables expressed in levels. Column (3) includes the
1911 levels in the set of control variables. The speci￿cation of column (4) includes province ￿xed
e⁄ects.54 To account for possible pre-existing trends, column (5) introduces lagged change in vote
54Given that the dependent variable is expressed in di⁄erences, province ￿xed e⁄ects represent 1913 province-
speci￿c shocks compared to 1909 levels.
17for the Estrema, i.e. the percentage change between 1904 and 1909. In column (6) I also introduce
an interaction term between lagged vote change and enfranchisement. From column (5) it is clear
that the lagged dependent variable has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the 1909-1913 vote change, signalling
that the performance of Estrema candidates was trending di⁄erently across districts.
The point estimates appear to be stable. They decrease to a minimum of 0.167 when control
variables are introduced and increase to a maximum of 0.294 when province ￿xed e⁄ects are also
included. Controlling for a lagged dependent variable gives us a coe¢ cient of about 0.25. Statistical
signi￿cance of at least 10% is always achieved.
The coe¢ cients are easy to interpret, since both the dependent and independent variable are
expressed as percentages. Taking column (6) as a benchmark, a 1% increase in ￿E caused a 0.25%
increase in the votes of Estrema. The smallest estimate (column 3) is such that one standard
deviation in enfranchisement (almost 12%) corresponds to a 2% increase in Estrema votes. A
similar magnitude is implied by column (4), considering that within-province standard deviation
is equal to 6.4. These magnitudes are non-negligible. They imply that the di⁄erence between the
district of Regalbuto (￿E = 87) and that of Milan II (￿E = 21) generates a di⁄erence in votes
for Estrema of about 11% due to enfranchisement only.
Elected MPs
Table 5 shows OLS estimates of the impact of enfranchisement on the net seat gains of Estrema
candidates. Our dependent variable ￿S is equal to 1 if the Estrema gained the seat, -1 if they lost
it and 0 otherwise, since each district only elects one member.55
The table displays negative ￿E coe¢ cients across all speci￿cations. Introducing province ￿xed
e⁄ects makes the coe¢ cient signi￿cant at the 5% level. Including or not a lagged dependent variable
makes again little di⁄erence on our estimates, although the statistical signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient
signals the presence of pre-existing trends in the Estrema net seat gains.
Using column (6) we estimate that a 1% increase in ￿E reduces ￿S by 0.009% and a standard
deviation increase in ￿E decreases ￿S by about 0.5%. Overall, it appears that, in spite of the gains
in votes, net seat gains remained una⁄ected (or marginally adversely a⁄ected) by the enlargement
of the franchise.
Candidacy
There was no o¢ cial candidacy stage in Italian elections until the 1919 reform.56 It is therefore
di¢ cult to de￿ne an o¢ cially uncontested seat. If we de￿ne as uncontested a district where the
sum of votes of all candidates except the winner is less than 50 then we have 79 such districts in
1909 and 40 in 1913. If we use the more generous de￿nition that a district is uncontested if one
of the candidates obtains more than 90% of valid votes then we have 93 such districts in 1909
55Using maximum likelihood ordered probit (without the ￿xed e⁄ects) con￿rms the ￿ndings of table 5. Ordered
probit models, however, cannot include ￿xed e⁄ects. Since the estimates are not substantively di⁄erent, the oppor-
tunity to include province ￿xed e⁄ects appears to be a su¢ cient reason to prefer OLS estimates.
56Voters could write any name on a piece of paper, which is why o¢ cial records usually display a number of
￿dispersed￿votes (often just one or two votes) for various ￿candidates￿ .
18and 65 in 1913. In any event many districts, especially in the South, were contested by more
than one constitutional candidate but not by a candidate of the Estrema. There were 217 seats
with no candidate of the Estrema in 1900, 81 in 1904, 156 in 1909 and 95 in 1913. Observing a
candidate of the Estrema in 1913 but not in 1909 (and viceversa) could signal that expectations
about the performance of Estrema candidates in that districts have changed. Even not winning a
seat, a good performance could set the stage for future progress and send a signal to voters that
Estrema candidates were viable. In 1904, for example, both the Radicals and the Socialists had
candidates in a large number of districts that received a single-digit number of votes. The number
of candidates in 1909 was reduced (see Table 1) in order to concentrate resources and to avoid
sending negative signals. The result was an overall clear improvement in the seat per vote ratio.
We witness again an increase in the number of Estrema candidates in 1913, and it is useful to see
whether this can be linked to franchise extension.
Table 6 reports our results. The dependent variable ￿C is coded as 1 if there was no Estrema
candidate in 1909 and there is a candidate in 1913, -1 if there was an Estrema candidate in 1909 but
no candidate in 1913, and 0 otherwise. The estimated coe¢ cients show that larger enfranchisement
was associated on average to a positive ￿C. This e⁄ect becomes statistically insigni￿cant when
province ￿xed e⁄ects are included. The estimated magnitudes are small, indicating, using the
speci￿cation with province ￿xed e⁄ects, that a 1% increase in franchise is associated with a 0.003%
increase in ￿C:
Aristocrats and traditional elites
In 1909 and 1913, aristocrats represented almost one ￿fth of elected MPs (91 in the 1909
parliament and 88 in 1913). In 1913 there were 31 transitions of an electoral district from an
aristocrat to a non-aristocrat and 28 on the other direction. Let us call ￿A a variable equal to 1
if a district transits from a non-aristocrat to an aristocrat, -1 if the transit happens in the other
direction and 0 otherwise. Table 7 reports OLS coe¢ cients where ￿A is used as dependent variable.
With no change in 449 out of 508 cases, the variation in the dependent variable is small.
The coe¢ cient of enfranchisement never achieves 10% signi￿cance level. More importantly, the
estimated coe¢ cients are never negative, indicating that a higher enfranchisement level is more
likely to have caused an aristocrat to gain a seat rather than loosing it. One within-province
standard deviation in enfranchisement gives us an increase in ￿A of around 2% (using the coe¢ cient
of column 4).
This analysis has then been replicated by using an analogously de￿ned variable ￿elite which in-
cludes identi￿able members of the traditional elites. ￿elite includes aristocrats and non-aristocratic
landowners, military,57 diplomats58 and members of political dynasties.59 Although there is a sub-
57High ranked militaries had to sworn their loyalty to the Crown and were usually recruited among aristocrats or
other in￿ uential families trusted by the King.
58People in charge of foreign policy were usually very close to the Crown and were recruited among the most
traditional and in￿ uential families.
59An MP has been classi￿ed as being a member of a political dynasty when it has been possible to establish a
family link with at least one other MP from the same or previous Italian parliaments (including the non-elected
19stantial overlap between these groups (for example, most high ranked militaries were aristocrats),
the variable elite includes 134 MPs in 1913 and 127 in 1909 with 45 negative and 37 positive transi-
tions in the 1909-1913 period. The results are very similar to those we found for aristocrats alone,
with slightly larger coe¢ cients. Using column (4) of Table 8 as benchmark, the 0.0044 coe¢ cient
implies a 3% increase in ￿elite as a result of an increase of one (within-province) standard devia-
tion in enfranchisement. Both in table 7 and in table 8 the columns that include lagged dependent
variables display smaller coe¢ cients and larger standard errors.
Electoral district competitiveness
Regulated competition for power is a key characteristic of democracy. Did enfranchisement
increase the overall level of electoral competition? This question has been addressed by using the
Her￿ndahl-Hirshman index (HHI) of competition and using candidates rather than parties as units
of observation (i.e. ignoring the candidates￿party a¢ liation). Indicating with si the vote share of
candidate i, the HHI index is calculated as H =
P
i s2
i: The index ranges from 0 (a large number of
candidates with negligible number of votes) to 1 (an unopposed candidate). The results (reported
in table 9) show that enfranchisement caused a slight increase in electoral competition, although
the coe¢ cient is statistically signi￿cant only in the simple regression of column (1).
Turnout
The 1913 election saw a generalized decline in electoral participation, with overall turnout
rate decreasing to 59% from 65.4% in 1909. Table 10 shows that this decline was caused by the
increase in the number of registered voters, since the newly enfranchised had a lower propensity
to participate compared to pre-reform voters. In table 10 the dependent variable is the change in
turnout rates between the 1913 and the 1909 elections. Across all speci￿cations we ￿nd a negative
e⁄ect of ￿E on turnout. Using column 4 as benchmark, we have that a 1% increase in the share
of newly enfranchised voters decresed turnout by 0.24%. Hence, the political impact of the reform
was certainly mitigated by the lower participation rates of the newly enfranchised.
Summary
Our baseline results suggest that the 1912 enfranchisement caused, on average, an increase in the
Estrema vote share of 1913 but had a negative e⁄ect, or at best no e⁄ect, on Estrema parliamentary
representation. Enfranchisement also had no signi￿cant impact on the parliamentary representation
of aristocrats and other traditional elites. Seat competitiveness and the entry of Estrema candidates
improved only marginally, if at all.
These results are puzzling. Why were increased vote shares not translated into an increased
parliamentary representation? And why were traditional elites not a⁄ected? These questions strike
at the core of current debates about democratization. If universal su⁄rage and a massive input of
new voters into the electoral body has no substantial implications for the distribution of legislative
power then it is legitimate to ask how can democratization serve as a commitment device to future
Senate).
20redistribution. At the same time, however, our results document that new voters did support
Estrema candidates more than the previously enfranchised, hence voting patterns re￿ ected, on
average, what would emerge from economic con￿ ict Æ la Meltzer & Richard.
We will return on these questions in Section 5, where we will explore some of the hurdles that
might have prevented the Estrema from taking advantage of the reform.
4.2 Robustness checks
4.2.1 Placebo treatments
For each of the outcomes, regressions have been re-run using the corresponding 1904-1909 change as
dependent variable. Since enfranchisement in 1913 does not have an impact on previous elections,
non-null results in these regressions would signal that pre-existing trends in outcomes are correlated
with the subsequent enfranchisement and could therefore bias its estimated impact. In the interest
of space, for each outcome I only report the results from two speci￿cations: one which includes all
control variables (both the 1911 levels and 1901-1911 changes) and one which also includes province
￿xed e⁄ects. Results are reported in table 11. The vote share change of Estrema candidates in
1904-1909 appears to be negatively related to subsequent enfranchisement and is never signi￿cant
at conventional levels (columns 1 and 2). These results, together with those obtained in columns
(5) and (6) of table 4, make it unlikely that the change in the Estrema vote share between 1909
and 1913 is due to pre-existing voting trends.
Columns 3-14 present placebo treatment regressions for the remaining outcomes. Overall there
appears to be no relationship between enfranchisement in 1913 and the other outcomes measured
as 1904-1909 changes, with the notable exception of ￿A, ￿elite and ￿turnout (when province
￿xed e⁄ects are included): The chances to be elected of aristocrats and elites are decreasing in
districts that display higher enfranchisement levels in 1913. The estimated coe¢ cients are large
and statistically signi￿cant: districts that experienced one standard deviation above the mean in
￿E saw a decrease in ￿elite between 1904 and 1909 ranging between 5% (using the coe¢ cient of
column 11 and the overall standard deviation which is almost 12) and 7% (using the coe¢ cient
of column 12 and the within province standard deviation of 6.4). The corresponding ￿gures for
an aristocrat are respectively 4.4% and 5%. Since self-selection into treatment was not an option,
we cannot rule out that enfranchisement stopped the decline in representation of aristocrat and
elite MPs. These results are consistent with the presence of an intra-elite con￿ ict of the following
form: suppose that an emerging enfranchised bourgeoisie was increasingly displacing aristocrats
and the traditional establishment from parliamentary seats; then, the massive franchise extension
of 1912 might have helped some elite members to keep their seats. Whether e⁄ects of this sort
were anticipated or not makes a big di⁄erence for our interpretation of the results but remains
unfortunately moot in the absence of further evidence.
214.2.2 Male illiteracy rates
Regressions so far do not include male illiteracy rate in the list of control variables. The reason is
that, being the franchise restricted on literacy grounds, illiteracy rates would absorb part of the
causal e⁄ect that we are trying to estimate. The 1901-1911 di⁄erence in illiteracy rate has instead
always been included since this helps identifying a more appropriate counterfactual: franchise
would have naturally expanded with literacy even without the reform.
Table 12 reports regressions that include the illiteracy rate of males aged 6 and above. The
estimated impact of enfranchisement di⁄ers only marginally from our previous estimates, suggesting
that whether franchise expansion was due to the removal of the literacy barrier or to the removal
of other obstacles did not matter: literate and illiterate newly enfranchised voters did not behave
di⁄erently on average.60 The illiteracy coe¢ cient is never signi￿cant, except in the equation referred
to the aristocrat net seat gain. Ceteris paribus, aristocrats appear to have done worse in districts
with high illiteracy rates.61
4.3 The geography of the e⁄ect
Italian regions di⁄ered in a number of characteristics. The North-West was the most industrialized
and richer part of the country. It also had a higher share of agricultural workers who cultivated their
own land, while large estates prevailed in the South. The North and some regions of the Centre,
both in industrial and agricultural areas, had a better organized labour force, stronger unions
and political organizations. Hence, our ￿rst step in uncovering heterogeneous e⁄ects is simply
to run our regressions with an interaction term between ￿E and area dummies, corresponding
to districts in the North-West, North-East, Centre and South. Results are reported in Table 13,
which focusses on vote shares of the Estrema and on net seat gains of, respectively, Estrema,
aristocrats and elite. The benchmark speci￿cation now includes the area dummies instead of the
provinces: columns 1,3,5,7 report the results and show that, although some di⁄erences occour, the
sign and approximate magnitude of the ￿E coe¢ cient are not substantively a⁄ected by replacing
the province ￿xed e⁄ects with the area dummies. We then introduce the interaction terms.
Columns 2,4,6,8 provide an unexpected picture of the geography of the e⁄ect of enfranchisement.
In terms of votes, although no interaction term is statistically signi￿cant, the magnitudes indicate
that enfranchisement bene￿ted the Estrema mainly in the South, with a smaller positive e⁄ect in
the North West and negative e⁄ects in the North East and Centre. In terms of net seat gains, the
e⁄ect was negative everywhere and it is 10% statistically signi￿cant for the Centre. In the Centre we
also have a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the net seat gains of aristocrats. The e⁄ect is positive
but not signi￿cant in the North West and North East and is instead negative and signi￿cant in
60Since we observe an impact neither on the competitiveness of electoral districts nor on ￿C; we should also
conclude that political actors did not expect literate and illiterate newly enfranchised voters to behave di⁄erently.
61I also run regressions that include an interaction term between illiteracy and ￿E: There is nothing relevant
to report about those regressions (probably also because ￿E and illiteracy rates are highly correlated) with the
exception of a positive interaction e⁄ect on ￿C.
22the South. Column 8 con￿rms that, in the South, enfranchisement had negative consequences for
legislators coming from the elite, although the e⁄ect is now smaller and statistically insigni￿cant.
It was instead in the North West that the elite bene￿ted the most and the e⁄ect has similar size and
direction, although with larger standard errors, in the North East and the Centre. In conclusion,
and di⁄erently from what most politicians of the time expected,62 there is nothing suggesting that
newly enfranchised Southerners voted more conservatively than in other parts of the country, while
the opposite appears more likely.63
4.4 Inequality
As discussed in previous sections, inequality is a key variable for theories of democratization. Larger
inequality should amplify the consequences of enfranchisement by increasing the redistributive
demands of the pivotal voter.
Measuring wealth or income inequality in the electoral districts of 1909-1913 is di¢ cult, since
data on income and wealth distribution is not available. There is, however, information that can
be used to imperfectly approximate inequality. By using data from 1911 Census we can construct
the following indicator:
Inequality =
[% agricultural workers who do not own land + % blue collar industrial workers]
% owners of real estate property
The numerator represents the percentage of employees not owning their means of production,
while the denominator approximates the di⁄usion of property. As the percentage of real estate
owners increases we assume property is more di⁄used and inequality goes down. When instead
larger shares of the population are employed in unskilled jobs and do not own their means of
production we assume inequality goes up. Both assumptions could clearly be wrong, since there is
no upper bound to how much the richest could earn or own and our index contains no information
about that. Although this indicator would be inappropriate in a developed society, where property
is di⁄used and employees￿salaries absorb a consistent share of the output, it is probably less so for
Italy 1911, when only about 10% of the population owned real estate and salaries where not far
from subsistence levels.
Table 14 reports regression coe¢ cients where our inequality indicator, normalized to be be-
tween 0 and 1, is included both as a direct e⁄ect and interacted with ￿E: Results show that the
direct e⁄ect of inequality is positive, indicating that the parties of the Estrema gained votes in
more unequal districts. Where inequality was higher, however, enfranchisement reduced both the
vote and the net seat gain for the Estrema, as can be seen from the interaction term. Although
the standard errors are such that we cannot rule out the possibility of no e⁄ect, the sign of the
62A noteworthy exception, as we have seen, was Gaetano Salvemini.
63There appears to have been no signi￿cant di⁄erence between urban and rural areas. An interaction between
￿E and the proportion of population living in urban areas turns out to be always far from any acceptable statistical
signi￿cance. Results are not reported in the interest of space but are available from the author.
23interaction term is opposite to what expected. It is so also for the net seat gains of aristocrats and
elite, although the standard errors are too large in this case to allow any meaningful inference.
4.5 The election of 1919
To study the long run consequences of the 1912 reform is di¢ cult. Between the 1913 and the
subsequent (1919) election, World War I brings dramatic social and political changes. In the early
twenties the advent of fascism makes elections irrelevant and political parties (except the fascist) are
eventually outlawed. For the purpose of our exercise an important obstacle to long run comparisons
is a new reform, passed in 1919, that introduces proportional representation and re-draws district
boundaries reducing them from 508 to 54. The 1919 reform also introduces full univeral manhood
su⁄rage, extending the franchise to those adults aged 21-30 and still subject to literacy and census
restrictions. This reform makes the 1919 election not directly comparable with previous ones.
In this section, with all the necessary caveats, we use the 1919 electoral districts as observation
units and compare 1919 results with the results obtained in 1909 and 1913 within the 1919 electoral
districts boundaries. This task is facilitated by the fact that 1919 electoral districts follow province
boundaries64 and each pre-1919 electoral district is also entirely contained within a province. The
comparison is therefore based on real and not notional data, although the process that generates
the data is now di⁄erent.
Results are presented in table 15. In the ￿rst two columns the dependent variable is the






i : In other terms, we study the overall e⁄ect of the 1913 and the 1919 reforms. All
regressions include the same controls used previously, this time calculated using the 1911 and 1921
Censuses. Results show an overall anti-Estrema e⁄ect of enfranchisement. A 1% increase in ￿E is
now associated with a 0.53% decrease in Estrema vote share. This negative e⁄ect raises to 0.84%
and becomes statistically signi￿cant at the 10% level when area dummies are introduced.65
Columns (3) and (4) separate the e⁄ect of the 1912 enfranchisement from that of the 1919










i : Given that these indicators span a 10-year period, the assumptions for their reliability are
now more likely to be violated. They should nevertheless provide a rough indication of the share
of 1919 voters who were enfranchised, respectively, in 1912 and 1919. Both speci￿cations (without
and with area dummies) display negative coe¢ cients, with the e⁄ect being particularly strong (and
statistically signi￿cant) in the case of ￿E1:
Columns 5-8 repeat the same exercise using the net seat gains of Estrema candidates in the 1919
electoral districts as dependent variable. In this case enfranchisement e⁄ects are always negative
but never statistically signi￿cant, showing that the impressive gains in seats of Estrema candidates
64The 69 provinces were aggregated into 54 districts by including more than one province in some districts,
but never by cutting province boundaries. Data on electoral results of the 1919 elections are taken from Istituto
Nazionale di Statistica (1946) and Caramani (1999).
65These are the four geographic areas used in Section 4.3.
24in the 1919 election (the Socialist party increased its MPs from 78 to 156) have no link with the
two franchise extensions.
Although, for the many reasons discussed above, these estimates should be taken with caution,
they appear to suggest that, in spite of the prevailing account given in most history books, en-
franchisement did not bene￿t the Estrema. A slightly longer perspective suggests that the overall
extension of the franchise, through the 1912 and the 1919 reforms, had negative implications for the
Estrema in terms of vote shares and at best no implication in terms of legislative representation.
5 Why so little e⁄ect on representation?
Indipendently of the motives that may lead an elite to concede democracy, it is reasonable to
expect that this same elite (or part of it) will engage in activities that minimize the pro-poor
impact of institutional reforms (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006b). In the context of the 1913
election, historians have documented at least two types of such activities: 1) a secret alliance
between Giolitti and the Catholics (who were o¢ cially not permitted by the Vatican to take part
in any form of political activity); 2) political violence, often perpetrated in cooperation or under
the protection of local police force. This Section will show that the Estrema gained its votes mostly
where they were irrelevant and systematically lost votes were they could have made a di⁄erence in
terms of legislative representation. This makes it very plausible that elite￿ s in￿ uence and intensi￿ed
collective action prevented more favourable outcomes for Estrema candidates.
5.1 Swing districts
It is puzzling to ￿nd that enfranchisement had a positive e⁄ect on Estrema vote shares but no
e⁄ect (or even a negative e⁄ect) on Estrema net seat gains. This suggests that votes were gained
where not needed and were instead lost where they mattered the most. That many votes end up
making little or no di⁄erence is typical of majoritarian single-member districts.
To further investigate this possibility I contruct a dummy variable to separate swing from non-
swing districts. The swing districts are de￿ned as those satisfying at least one of the following
conditions: 1) the elected MP changed from Estrema to non-Estrema or viceversa in the 1909
election; 2) there was a run-o⁄ between an Estrema and a non-Estrema candidate in 1909; 3) the
vote share of parties of the Estrema in 1909 was between 30% and 60%. The ￿rst two criteria
are self-explanatory. The third allows a rather generous de￿nition of marginality. In an election
that represented a ￿jump in the dark￿ , 60% of votes in the previous election was still probably
insu¢ cient to de￿ne a seat as safe. On the other side, a candidate with 30% of the votes could
hope to reach the run-o⁄ stage and possibly be elected. The three criteria identify 226 districts
that are de￿ned as ￿swing￿ .66
66Our results are not particularly sensitive to small variations in the boundaries used in criterion 3.
25The regressions reported in table 16 show that on average the Estrema lost votes in swing
districts (columns 1 and 2). The interaction between swing and ￿E has a negative sign (columns
3 and 4) showing that enfranchisement had a negative impact on Estrema vote shares in swing
districts. For each increase of 1% in ￿E the Estrema lost between 0.3% and 0.4% of the votes,
depending on the speci￿cation. Since the baseline e⁄ect of the swing variable is positive, compared
to non-swing districts the Estrema gained votes, on average, in swing districts when ￿E < 45 and
lost them otherwise. The impact of this vote loss on seats was, however, less clear, with the swing
coe¢ cient being negative and signi￿cant in column 5 but positive when province ￿xed e⁄ects are
included (column 6). Columns 7 and 8 show that in swing districts with high ￿E the Estrema also
lost seats, although the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is statistically signi￿cant only if province
￿xed e⁄ects are not included.
5.2 The ￿Gentiloni pact￿
Several candidates in the 1913 election signed a pact with the Catholic Electoral Association led
by Conte Ottorino Gentiloni. While the Association was not allowed by the Vatican to have its
own candidates, it could provide support to speci￿c candidates committed to Catholic values and
policies. Local bishops could also demand from the Vatican a suspension of the non-expedit which,
if obtained, would allow open support to favoured candidates. The so-called Gentiloni pact was
signed secretly and the direct involvement of Giolitti (or whether Giolitti himself signed the pact
or not) is still a matter of historical controversy. A list of signatories was revealed just after the
election67 by a Radical anti-clerical publication. It has been proved that the list contained many
inaccuracies, though most names had been correctly identi￿ed.68
A detailed reconstruction of the events and a list of the signatories, based on research conducted
in the Vatican archives, can be found in Piretti (1994). By using Piretti￿ s list of signatories it is
possible to construct a dummy variable ￿Gentiloni￿equal to one in districts where one candidate
signed the pact (there was never more than one signatory per district). It is possible that the
impact of enfranchisement was di⁄erent in districts that saw an explict participation of Catholics
and a suspension of the non-expedit. In this sense our previous estimates could hide a relevant and
historically important heterogeneity.
Table 17 reports regression results on the impact of the Gentiloni pact. First, it is immediately
clear that in Gentiloni districts the Estrema faced a massive vote share loss (columns 1 and 2)
and seat loss (columns 5 and 6). Had the Gentiloni pact been signed at random, we could have
concluded that its impact was huge. It is instead reasonable to assume (as con￿rmed by historical
research) that the pact was signed where the marginal return of the Catholic vote was higher and
therefore we lack a proper counterfactual to assess its impact.
Our next step is to explore whether the e⁄ect of the Gentiloni pact depends on enfranchisement
levels. The negative interaction terms in columns 3 and 4 tell us that the negative impact of the
67￿I candidati del Conte Gentiloni Vicario elettorale di Sua SantitÆ￿ , L￿ Idea democratica, November 16, 1913.
68See Piretti (1994).
26Gentiloni pact on Estrema vote shares was stronger in districts with high ￿E: Conversely we could
say that the positive impact of ￿E on Estrema vote share is reduced when the pact was signed.
Assuming that the vote choices of the formerly enfranchised did not change, we could conclude that
the average propensity to vote for Estrema candidates was, in districts where one of the candidates
signed the Gentiloni pact, lower among the newly enfranchised compared with pre-existing voters.
The same interaction term is instead positive and statistically indistinguishable from zero in the
net seat gain regressions (columns 7 and 8). Our conclusion is that, although the pact massively
reduced the gains of the Estrema in terms of votes, with a stronger e⁄ect in districts with many
new voters, its overall e⁄ect in terms of seats, which is substantial, is the same that it would have
obtained without the franchise extension.
5.3 Discussion
The importance of the Gentiloni pact should not be underestimated: it signs the uno¢ cial entry of
Catholics into Italian politics. It is probably for this reason that most historians have considered
the pact a reaction of traditional elites to the dangers posed by a rapidly expanding Estrema.
Gentiloni himself regarded the pact as a great success and, ultimately, as the device that preserved
the established order. It is however useful to note that signing the Gentiloni pact and being in a
swing discrict (according to our de￿nition) are uncorrelated. The proportion of swing districts in
which the Gentiloni pact was signed is 42%. This proportion actually increases to 46% in non-swing
districts. This may re￿ ect better information available to political actors at the time (our de￿nition
of swing is based on 1909 electoral returns) or the di⁄erent strength of Catholic organizations in
di⁄erent areas.
The orthogonality between these two variables point to the existence of at least two forces that
worked against the Estrema. In the case of the Gentiloni pact this is a democratic force, because it
consisted in increasing the participation of self-excluded segments of the population. It shows that
a substantial share of newly enfranchised voters were in fact conservative. For swing districts we
know less about the mechanisms that penalized Estrema candidates. One factor which is recurrent
in the newspapers of the time is political violence and intimidation. Articles from a reputable and
moderate source like Corriere della Sera report numerous instances in which labour organizations
were attacked and poor voters were confronted by violent groups that operated under the protection
of local police forces.69 In other terms, voters were not forced to vote for disliked candidates (the
vote was, in principle, secret) bur rather ￿persuaded￿to stay home. This means that the Gentiloni
pact and political violence should be expected to have opposite e⁄ects on participation: the ￿rst
should increase turnout by allowing Catholics to go to the polls, the second should decrease it by
preventing Estrema supporters to do so. These hypotheses are testable by using turnout data.
In table 18 the dependent variable is the di⁄erence between the turnout rates in 1913 and 1909.
69See for example the article "Ricordi di una domenica di passione" by Ugo Ojetti, appeared on Corriere delle Sera
(November 6, 1913), providing a very detailed recostruction of violence and intimidation in the southern district of
Molfetta.
27Columns (1) and (2) show that turnout was indeed lower in swing districts. Depending on whether
we include province ￿xed e⁄ects or not (and always including all the other controls) being in a
swing district decreased turnout by a percentage that ranges between 3.3 and 3.7. Columns (3)
and (4), however, show that the interaction between the swing dummy and ￿E has a positive sign,
suggesting that, in districts with high enfranchisement rates, the negative impact of being a swing
district was reduced.70
Columns (5) and (6) show that the Gentiloni dummy is also correlated with a relative decline
in turnout. The magnitude is smaller compared with the swing dummy. The interaction with ￿E
is in this case statistically indistinguishable from zero (columns 7 and 8). These results suggest
that, if there was an increase in turnout due to the Gentiloni pact, it must have been more than
o⁄set by other forces that made turnout lower where the pact was signed.
Our analysis seems to indicate that unobserved events that happened in key districts may have
a played a role in reducing turnout and Estrema vote. In districts where a candidate signed the
Gentiloni pact the Estrema performed worse than average but, surprisingly, the Catholic vote was
not su¢ cient to boost turnout rates. Political violence and intimidation is abundantly documented
and, decades later, led authors like Gaetano Salvemini to draw a parallel between those facts and
the subsequent advent of fascism.
6 Final remarks
The 1912 Italian franchise extension constitutes an ideal setting to study the relationship between
democratization and political change. Enfranchisement in Italy has been less gradual than in most
other Western European countries. A laggard until then, Italy passed in 1912 a reform that made it
suddenly one the countries with the most generous franchise regulations. By conceding the voting
right to all males aged above thirty the 1912 reform enfranchised the poorest segments of the
population, trebling the electorate and leaving electoral rules and district boundaries unchanged.
The reform was passed at a time in which labour unions and democratic and socialist parties
were well established political actors, pushing in the direction of radical economic and institutional
reforms. Of all the electoral reforms passed in Western Europe before WWI, the Italian 1912
franchise extension o⁄ers a unique opportunity to study the consequences of democratization.
Our empirical study suggests that the political changes associated with the reform were minimal.
Although the extreme left saw an increase in vote shares, patterns of legislative representation
remained broadly una⁄ected. Enfranchisement did not increase the number of seats won by the
left and did not cause a displacement of traditional and aristocratic elites from their parliamentary
seats.
These ￿ndings can be related to various streams of theoretical and empirical research on democ-
ratization. In particular, they appear to be hard to fully reconcile with some of the most in￿ uential
70The coe¢ cients are such that the e⁄ect of the swing dummy remains negative also in the district with the
highest ￿E. In the district with the smallest (highest) ￿E; the impact of the swing dummy is -12% (-2%).
28economic theories of democratization. These theories, discussed in the Introduction, are based on
a one-dimensional representation of societal con￿ ict which corresponds to the economic interests
of di⁄erent groups. When this con￿ ict is channeled into democratic institutions and elites concede
political equality, the consequence is a larger government and more redistribution (Acemoglu and
Robinson) or more public good provision (Lizzeri and Persico). This should happen irrespectively
of whether democracy is used by elites as a commitment device to future redistribution (Acemoglu
and Robinson) or is the consequence of an intra-elite con￿ ict (Lizzeri and Persico).
A substantial body of evidence is compatible with this view. Some of this evidence is based on
historical cross-country analysis, like Lindert (1994, 1996, 2004), Boix (2001) and Aidt and Jensen
(2009). Husted and Kenny (1997) present evidence of a positive impact on welfare spending of
removing literacy tests and poll taxes in the US states during the period 1950-1988. More generally,
an emerging body of empirical literature provides sound evidence of instances in which democracy
is good for the poor (Avelino et al. 2004; Stasavage, 2005; Kudamatsu, 2011): this implies that
democratization can be used by elites as a committment device to future pro-poor outcomes.71
The Italian enfranchisement case does not appear to entirely ￿t this view. By documenting an
impact of enfranchisement on the vote share of parties with a programme of social reforms, our
results ￿t well the Meltzer and Richard approach and the theories of democratization of Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000), Boix (2003) and Lizzeri and Persico (2004). If we assume that parties stand
for di⁄erent policies then our ￿ndings are compatible with the view that the new voters, mostly
poor, would disproportionately support the left.72 However, we also document that parliamentary
representation and other political outcomes remained essentially una⁄ected by universal su⁄rage.
Other ￿ndings also do not conform to the idea that economic con￿ ict mechanically translates
into political representation. Inequality, for example, should increase demand for redistribution
according to Meltzer and Richard. We ￿nd instead that enfranchisement has a negative impact
on the performance of social reformers, however measured, precisely in the most unequal districts,
where demand for redistribution should be higher. This ￿nding is more compatible with the view
that inequality may have facilitated elite￿ s ￿capture￿of poor voters.
Our results indicate that there is no mechanical link between democratization and political
change, conforming to the claim of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) that ￿when elites who mo-
nopolize de jure political power lose this privilege, they may still exert disproportionate in￿uence in
politics by increasing the intensity of their collective action￿ . Following this intuition, we provide
an analysis of the potential reasons that led the parties of the Estrema to bene￿t from universal
su⁄rage in terms of votes but not in terms of representation. The secret ￿Gentiloni pact￿between
the Catholic Electoral Association and a number of conservative candidates, is a prime example
of the e⁄orts made by elites to neutralize the impact of democratization. It is quite possible that,
rather than to generate a progressive policy change, democratization might have been used to
71Some studies, however, do not ￿nd relevant di⁄erences between democracies and non-democracies (Mulligan et
al. 2004; Ross, 2006)
72In this respect, the 1912 Italian reform is di⁄erent from the UK Second Reform Act, which generated little
increased support for the Liberal party (Berlinsky and Dewan, 2011).
29please some particular conservative groups (namely, the clericals): this would again suggest that
economic con￿ ict did not easily translate into political cleavages. From a policy perspective, MPs
who had signed the Gentiloni pact committed themselves to a pro-Catholic agenda, which suggests
that our ￿ndings concern both the political and the policy dimensions.
We show, however, that forces other than the Gentiloni pact must have played an important
role in key swing districts, where turnout was substantially lower. It is generally well documented
by newspapers of the time that the election of 1913 happened in a climate of unusual violence and
intimidation. The purpose of intimidation was often to ensure that poor voters stayed at home and
did not exercise their right to vote, which would explain the lower turnout rates in swing districts.
Hence, our ￿ndings can be regarded as providing support for the claim of Acemoglu and Robinson
(2008) that the consequences of institutional reforms depend on the interaction between de jure and
de facto political power. Further investigation is necessary to assess more precisely what happened
in the key swing districts, but the patterns we uncover are at least compatible with the idea that
elite￿ s anti-Estrema e⁄orts (of whatever sort) were particularly strong in those districts.
Two other papers provide micro-level quantitative evidence on the consequences of enfran-
chisement in Western Europe. They both focus on comparatively smaller reforms implemented
in the UK. Aidt et. al (2010) study the expansion of the voting franchise in English and Welsh
municipalities between 1868 and 1886 and conclude that franchise extension had a retrenchment
e⁄ect, since demand for local public goods came from urban elite and not from the middle classes.
Berlinsky and Dewan (2011) study the UK Second Reform Act and ￿nd that franchise extension
had no impact on electoral support for the Liberal party. Both papers focus on British reforms
that enfranchised only a fraction of the male population. After the Second Reform Act, which en-
franchised mainly the urban working classes, only about one third of adult males had the right to
vote in Britain. In this sense, while the Lizzeri and Persico franchise extension hypothesis is better
re￿ ected in the electoral reforms of 19th century Britain, the Acemoglu and Robinson hypothesis
faces a more appropriate test with the 1912 Italian reform.
The list of intriguing questions surrounding the reform that remain to be addressed is too
long to be discussed here. For what concerns speci￿cally the present study, at least three issues
deserve better investigation. First, we ignored possible behavioural changes that enfranchisement
may have induced among the previously enfranchised. In one extreme case, these voters may have
changed entirely their behaviour, for example because the fear of new voters may have induced more
conservative choices. This is not necessarily a problem for our conclusions: the counterfactual to
actual 1913 election outcomes is what would have happened in 1913 without universal su⁄rage. If
a change of any sort in the voting behaviour of the formerly enfranchised was induced by universal
su⁄rage, then the voting returns of 1909 remain a valid counterfactual. Nevertheless, this remains
an interesting question, especially in a context of increasing popularity of nationalistic and anti-
democratic ideas which began to spread among the elites in those years.
A second dimension which has been only partially analysed is turnout. Our coe¢ cients establish
a direct link between registration and outcomes, bypassing the turnout stage. Turnout, however,
30was di⁄erent for the formerly and newly enfranchised, with the latter less likely to vote. While
the political implications of our ￿ndings remain una⁄ected by this consideration, a more detailed
study of turnout would help clarifying the underlying mechanisms that generated our results.
A third issue concerns the long term consequences of the reform. Although the impact of de
jure political equalization on representation could be small in the short run, it may nevertheless
trigger a change that manifests its e⁄ects only after some time, and in particular when the newly
enfranchised voters are su¢ ciently mobilized and informed. Our analysis of the 1919 election is
only a small contribution in that direction. The context is unfortunately not favorable to the study
of long run consequences, ￿rst because the electoral system changed and then because Italy became
a dictatorship only ten years after the reform we study. Other contexts could be more favourable
to explore this question with quantitative methods. This remains a very important issue to be
addressed by future research.
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Figure 1. Number of registered voters in Italy (1870-1921) 
(the red line indicates 1912)   
 
 
Figure 2. Number of strikes and participants in strikes (1900-1913) 
(the red line indicates 1911, when the electoral reform was proposed) 
Source: Ministero dell’agricoltura, industria e commercio. Direzione generale della statistica: Statistica degli 


























Figure 6. Enfranchisement and change in votes for candidates of the Estrema 
(NW stands for North-West, NE for North-East, C for Centre and S for South) Table 1: The parties of the Estrema between 1904 and 1913
Party Year
number of 









Socialists 1904 377 17.01 20.85 27
1909 234 14.17 18.59 40
1913 351 20.91 23.02 78
Republicans 1904 77 4.34 4.26 21
1909 50 4.43 4.35 23
1913 67 3.5 3.52 17
Radicals 1904 116 9.32 9.08 32
1909 130 10.98 11.57 53
1913 150 12.78 12.35 73Table 2. Aristocrats and elite in the Camera dei Deputati
1904 1909 1913
Aristocrat 97 91 88
Landowners 27 23 27
Military 22 19 18
Diplomatic 10 6 8
Dynasty 54 44 36
Total traditional elites 146 134 127
Notes: data collected from the biographies contained in Malatesta (1940). Some MPs belong to more
than one group, hence the total number of MPs of elite background does not correspond to the sum of
members in each group.Table 3: Correlates of enfranchisement
Dep. variable ∆E ∆E ∆E(t-1) ∆E(t-1) ∆E ∆E ∆E ∆E
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
male illiteracy 1911 (%) 0.4696*** 0.4927*** -0.0341** -0.0119
(0.0211) (0.0273) (0.0172) (0.0262)
vote percentage Estrema 1909 -0.0041*** -0.0024***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
vote percentage Estrema 1904 -0.0964*** -0.0502***
(0.0162) (0.0121)
vote percentage Estrema 1900
industrial workers (% population) 1911 -0.3406*** 0.0669 -0.7027*** -0.2999** -0.9842*** -0.4323**
(0.1125) (0.0880) (0.1086) (0.1472) (0.1299) (0.1852)
urbanized (% population) 1911 -0.0563*** 0.0123 0.0257 -0.0750*** 0.0250 -0.0813***
(0.0201) (0.0199) (0.0234) (0.0237) (0.0271) (0.0259)
agricultural workers own land (% pop) 1911 -0.0973 -0.0048 -0.9981*** -0.3661 -1.2384*** -0.3196
(0.1229) (0.1111) (0.1120) (0.2700) (0.1355) (0.3125)
agr. workers not own land (% pop) 1911 -0.3138*** 0.0824 0.1305* 0.2918** 0.0098 0.2300*
(0.0629) (0.0636) (0.0705) (0.1130) (0.0851) (0.1243)
property of real estate (% population) 1911 -0.0934 0.0518 0.4928*** -0.1929 0.5383*** -0.2831*
(0.0933) (0.0897) (0.1086) (0.1612) (0.1227) (0.1708)
logarithm population 1911 4.5583* 3.0853 10.2107*** 12.6074*** 5.5723** 9.9833***
(2.3802) (2.0072) (2.4891) (2.3591) (2.4879) (2.2768)
(log pop 1911 - log pop 1901) 22.4079*** 17.4587*** 9.4654 4.2078 13.3898* 3.7828
(7.5874) (5.9459) (7.2184) (8.4696) (7.8097) (8.7122)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (1901-1911 differences) No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.5472 0.6207 0.0076 0.0719 0.5788 0.8128 0.4823 0.7900
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parenthesesTable 4: The effect of enfranchisement on the vote percentage of Estrema candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) 0.2509*** 0.1771** 0.1672* 0.2943** 0.2515* 0.2533*
(0.0756) (0.0818) (0.1004) (0.1478) (0.1437) (0.1423)








Constant -8.9633* -4.8679 -44.5906 -66.5627 -76.3220 -74.8758
(4.7169) (6.1427) (62.5930) (66.4891) (67.1687) (67.1198)
Controls (differences 1901-1911) no yes yes yes yes yes
Controls (1911 levels) no no yes yes yes yes
Province fixed effects no no No yes yes yes
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.0167 0.0327 0.0483 0.2555 0.2891 0.2907
Dep. variable: vote percentage change (1909-1913) of Estrema candidates
Notes. Control variables in 1901-1911 differences include: natural logarithm of population, percentage of male population above six which is illiterate, percentage
population employed in industry, percentage of agricultaral workers (owning land), percentage of agricultural workers (not owning land), percentage of the population
that owns real estate. Controls introduced as 1911 levels include all the above controls exept illiteracy rate and adds the percentage of the population living in urban
areas. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 5: The effect of enfranchisement on the Estrema net gain of seats 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) -0.0022 -0.0036* -0.0036 -0.0089** -0.0082** -0.0082**
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Change in Estrema MPs (1904-1909) -0.3769*** -0.5777**
(0.0549) (0.2907)




Constant 0.2486** 0.3094** 1.1541 -0.7227 -1.6623 -1.6235
(0.1190) (0.1513) (1.2145) (1.3324) (1.3419) (1.3369)
Controls (differences 1901-1911) no yes yes yes yes yes 
Controls (1911 levels) no no yes yes yes yes
Province fixed effects no no No yes yes yes
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.0033 0.0300 0.0417 0.2282 0.3137 0.3145
Dep. variable: Estrema net gain of seats
Notes. Control variables in 1901-1911 differences include: natural logarithm of population, percentage of male population above six which is illiterate, percentage population
employed in industry, percentage of agricultaral workers (owning land), percentage of agricultural workers (not owning land), percentage of the population that owns real
estate. Controls introduced as 1911 levels include all the above controls exept illiteracy rate and adds the percentage of the population living in urban areas. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 6: The effect of enfranchisement on the presence of Estrema candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913)
0.0063*** 0.0057*** 0.0028* 0.0026 0.0020 0.0029
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Estrema candidacy change (1904-1909)
-0.5175*** -1.4892***
(0.0509) (0.3118)




-0.2959*** -0.2454** -1.2890 -0.5558 -0.6322 -0.9675
(0.0936) (0.1179) (1.1940) (1.3222) (1.0593) (1.0539)
Controls (differences 1901-1911) no yes yes yes yes yes
Controls (1911 levels) no no yes yes yes yes
Province fixed effects no no No yes yes yes
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.0260 0.0389 0.0550 0.2306 0.4355 0.4475
Dep. variable: ∆C
Notes. Control variables in 1901-1911 differences include: natural logarithm of population, percentage of male population above six which is illiterate, percentage
population employed in industry, percentage of agricultaral workers (owning land), percentage of agricultural workers (not owning land), percentage of the
population that owns real estate. Controls introduced as 1911 levels include all the above controls exept illiteracy rate and adds the percentage of the population
living in urban areas. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 7. Enfranchisement and the election of aristocratic MPs
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) 0.0019 0.0020 0.0028 0.0027 0.0018 0.0016
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0039)
Aristocrat net seat gain (1904-1909) -0.1163** -0.4084
(0.0453) (0.3319)




Constant -0.1310 -0.1274 -0.1301 -0.2149 -0.1148 -0.0626
(0.1038) (0.1234) (0.9794) (1.2294) (1.2194) (1.2195)
Controls (differences 1901-1911) no yes yes yes yes yes
Controls (1911 levels) no no yes yes yes yes
Province fixed effects no no No yes yes yes
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.0044 0.0065 0.0143 0.1289 0.1408 0.1433
Dependent variable: net gain of seats by aristocrats
Notes. Control variables in 1901-1911 differences include: natural logarithm of population, percentage of male population above six which is illiterate, percentage
population employed in industry, percentage of agricultaral workers (owning land), percentage of agricultural workers (not owning land), percentage of the
population that owns real estate. Controls introduced as 1911 levels include all the above controls exept illiteracy rate and adds the percentage of the population
living in urban areas. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 8. Did enfranchisement cause the displacement of traditional elites from parliament?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913)
0.0019 0.0027 0.0033 0.0044 0.0025 0.0022
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0042)
Elite net seat gain (1904-1909)
-0.1663*** -0.4214
(0.0462) (0.3039)




-0.1433 -0.2074 -0.2222 -0.6906 -0.3888 -0.4335
(0.1140) (0.1360) (1.1340) (1.3793) (1.3473) (1.3495)
Controls (differences 1901-1911) no yes yes yes yes yes
Controls (1911 levels) no no yes yes yes yes
Province fixed effects no no No yes yes yes
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.0033 0.0083 0.0126 0.1227 0.1453 0.1469
Dependent variable: net seat gain by elite
Notes. Control variables in 1901-1911 differences include: natural logarithm of population, percentage of male population above six which is illiterate, percentage
population employed in industry, percentage of agricultaral workers (owning land), percentage of agricultural workers (not owning land), percentage of the population that
owns real estate. Controls introduced as 1911 levels include all the above controls exept illiteracy rate and adds the percentage of the population living in urban areas.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 9: The effect of enfranchisement on electoral competition
Dep variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) -0.0020*** -0.0012 0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0012
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0012)
HHI (1904-1909) -0.5640*** -0.2628
(0.0515) (0.3362)




Constant 0.0719 0.0257 -0.7697 -0.7448 -0.8620 -0.8499
(0.0474) (0.0571) (0.6785) (0.7530) (0.5939) (0.6011)
Controls (differences 1901-1911) no yes yes yes yes yes
Controls (1911 levels) no no yes yes yes yes
Province fixed effects no no No yes yes yes
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.0111 0.0304 0.0756 0.2173 0.4338 0.4352
Herfindahl-Hirshman index of electoral competition (1909-1913 change)
Notes. Control variables in 1901-1911 differences include: natural logarithm of population, percentage of male population above six which is illiterate, percentage
population employed in industry, percentage of agricultaral workers (owning land), percentage of agricultural workers (not owning land), percentage of the population
that owns real estate. Controls introduced as 1911 levels include all the above controls exept illiteracy rate and adds the percentage of the population living in urban
areas. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 10: Enfranchisement and turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) -0.3486*** -0.3066*** -0.3526*** -0.2438*** -0.1391* -0.1416*
(0.043) (0.046) (0.056) (0.088) (0.074) (0.075)
Change in turnout(1904-1909) -0.5554*** -0.4370
(0.045) (0.310)
Change in turnout (1904-1909) x 
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) -0.0018
(0.004)
Constant 18.1418*** 18.1575*** 9.7388 15.8938 51.2591 52.0785
(2.941) (3.376) (33.616) (40.312) (32.166) (32.204)
Controls (differences 1901-1911) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (1911 levels) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.1104 0.1369 0.1681 0.3160 0.5265 0.5268
Dep. Variable: Change in turnout percentage (1909-1913)
Notes. Control variables in 1901-1911 differences include: natural logarithm of population, percentage of male population above six which is illiterate, percentage
population employed in industry, percentage of agricultaral workers (owning land), percentage of agricultural workers (not owning land), percentage of the
population that owns real estate. Controls introduced as 1911 levels include all the above controls exept illiteracy rate and adds the percentage of the population
living in urban areas. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 11. Placebo treatment on 1904‐1909 changes
Dep. Variable Votes Votes Seats Seats Cand. Cand. HHI HHI Arist. Arist Elite Elite Turnout Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
ΔE -0.0002 -0.2014 0.0003 0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0037** -0.0078** -0.0042** -0.0114*** 0.0456 0.1885**
(0.0963) (0.1645) (0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0601) (0.0815)
Constant -44.6934 -45.9007 -2.2789* -2.4927* 0.2282 -0.1477 -0.1583 -0.2077 0.7534 0.8607 1.7158 1.8147 48.9835 63.6803*
(58.5097) (63.9131) (1.3315) (1.4210) (1.3224) (1.4125) (0.6592) (0.7470) (0.8258) (1.0054) (1.1512) (1.3027) (32.4385) (37.4314)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Province FE no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.0385 0.1727 0.0480 0.2083 0.0563 0.2077 0.0398 0.1756 0.0342 0.1652 0.0325 0.2009 0.0827 0.2724
Notes. The dependent variables in column 1-6 refers to the Estrema and it is, respectively, the Estrema 1904-1909 difference in percentage of votes (columns 1-2). the Estrema 1904-1909 net seat gain
(columns 3-4), the Estrema 1904-1909 candidacy. The dependent variable in columns 7-8 is the Herfindhal-Hirshman index of electoral competition. Columns 9 and 10 refer to the net seat gain (1904-
1909) of Aristocrats and columns 9-10 to the elite (1904-1909) net seat gain. Control variables include both 1911 levels and 1901-1911 differences as described in the Notes to Table 4. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 12: Introducing 1911 male illiteracy rate
Dep. variable Votes Votes Seats Seats Candidates Candidates HHI HHI Aristocrat Aristocrat Elite Elite Turnout Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
ΔE 0.2459* 0.2038 -0.0090** -0.0090** 0.0009 0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0010 0.0037 0.0026 0.0049 0.0028 -0.2727*** -0.1429*
(0.1479) (0.1415) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0043) (0.089) (0.077)
Lagged dep.  
Variable
-0.5497 0.0000 -1.5098*** -0.2340 -0.4018 -0.4231 -0.4362
(0.3421) (0.0000) (0.3110) (0.3378) (0.3166) (0.2967) (0.311)
Lagged dep. 
variable x ∆E
0.0049 0.0000 0.0142*** -0.0047 0.0042 0.0037 -0.0018
(0.0050) (0.0000) (0.0045) 0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0042) (0.004)
Illiteracy rate 
1911
0.4776 0.4877 0.0012 0.0012 0.0170** 0.0146** -0.0051 -0.0026 -0.0098* -0.0101* -0.0052 -0.0061 0.2849* 0.0124
(0.3110) (0.3072) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0059) (0.0037) (0.0028) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0063) (0.0061) (0.173) (0.148)
Constant -79.9742 -88.5687 -0.7565 -0.7565 -1.0335 -1.3866 -0.6020 -0.7746 0.0604 0.2200 -0.5453 -0.2603 7.8932 51.7078
(67.6834) (68.0586) (1.3558) (1.3558) (1.3225) (1.0485) (0.7644) (0.6109) (1.1886) (1.1799) (1.3661) (1.3368) (40.128) (32.430)
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.2587 0.2940 0.2282 0.2282 0.2404 0.4548 0.2209 0.4362 0.1350 0.1497 0.1239 0.1486 0.3198 0.5268
Controls (differences 1901-1911), Controls (1911 levels) and province fixed effects always included
Notes. Illiteracy rate is taken from the 1911 Census. It is represents the percentage of male population above 6 classified as illiterate. The dependent variables in column 1-6 refers to the Estrema
and it is, respectively, the Estrema 1909-1913 difference in percentage of votes (columns 1-2). the Estrema 1909-1913 net seat gain (columns 3-4), the Estrema 1909-1913 candidacy. Columns 7
and 8 refers to the net seat gain (1909-1913) of Aristocrats and columns 9-10 to the elite (1909-1913) net seat gain. Lagged dependent variables refer to the respective outcomes calculated in

















elite net seat gain elite net seat gain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) 0.0203 -0.0064** 0.0035 0.0047*
(0.1034) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0025)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) x 
North-West
0.0928 -0.0049 0.0042 0.0060*
(0.1184) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0032)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) x 
North-east
-0.2891 -0.0098 0.0053 0.0048
(0.3589) (0.0077) (0.0063) (0.0059)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) x 
Centre
-0.2725 -0.0087* 0.0069* 0.0059
(0.2602) (0.0047) (0.0036) (0.0043)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) x 
South
0.3454 -0.0098 -0.0101** -0.0076
(0.3865) (0.0068) (0.0051) (0.0068)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Area dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(0.3866) (0.0069) (0.0051) (0.0068)
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.0786 0.0838 0.0592 0.0608 0.0168 0.0311 0.0168 0.0249
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standar errors in parentheses. See table A.1 for a definition of geographic areas. Control variables include all the level and differences controls 




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) 0.2542* 0.4475* -0.0000 -0.0044 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0018 0.0007
(0.1342) (0.2360) (0.0032) (0.0051) (0.0026) (0.0044) (0.0029) (0.0049)
inequality 23.4068* 25.0922 1.0964** 0.7092 -0.1795 -0.3932 -0.1912 -0.2841
(13.2690) (21.4721) (0.4670) (0.6135) (0.7493) (0.8811) (0.7571) (0.8974)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) x 
inequality
-0.3119 -0.3395 -0.0124* -0.0104 0.0018 0.0065 0.0060 0.0104
(0.2435) (0.2953) (0.0072) (0.0085) (0.0111) (0.0126) (0.0114) (0.0133)
Constant -57.5301 -72.4084 0.5303 -0.9163 -0.0259 -0.0810 -0.1446 -0.3882
(63.8313) (67.8704) (1.2144) (1.3501) (0.9659) (1.2199) (1.1392) (1.3843)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Province fixed effects no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.0504 0.2569 0.0554 0.2312 0.0150 0.1309 0.0153 0.1275
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Control variables include both 1911 levels and 1901-1911 differences 
as described in the notes to table 4. Inequality is defined in section 6.4Table 15. Enfranchisement and the 1919 election
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Enfranchisement (1909-1919) -0.5282 -0.8375* -0.0725 -0.0603
(0.402) (0.428) (0.060) (0.073)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) -0.7828* -0.9932** -0.0937 -0.0755
(0.394) (0.459) (0.059) (0.070)
Enfranchisement (1913-1919) 0.1777 -0.2255 -0.0140 -0.0006
(0.810) (0.917) (0.102) (0.132)
Constant 42.9038 75.6047 44.2961 75.0065 7.4609 6.5540 7.5763 6.4956
(44.259) (48.293) (42.880) (48.847) (7.125) (7.831) (7.043) (7.879)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Area fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
R-squared 0.1822 0.2492 0.2061 0.2623 0.4779 0.4891 0.4844 0.4941
vote percentage change (1909‐1919) of Estrema candidates Estrema net seat gain (1909-1919)
Notes: The definition of the three enfranchisement variables are given in the text in Section 4.5. Area dummies are defined in the Notes to Table 13.  Control 
variables are the same included in other regressions, both in 1921-1911 differences and in 1911 levels. In this case, instead of the percentage of urban population 
for 1911 we have the population density both in differences and in its 1911 level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 16. The effect of enfranchisement in swing districts
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
swing -6.2907*** -6.3706*** 19.8646* 13.9225 -0.0794* 0.0611 0.5232** 0.4049
(2.2315) (2.4723) (10.8650) (11.6363) (0.0455) (0.0529) (0.2309) (0.2607)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) 0.3312** 0.4108** 0.0015 -0.0048
(0.1495) (0.1961) (0.0022) (0.0036)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) x swing -0.3902** -0.2990 -0.0069* -0.0055
(0.1756) (0.1854) (0.0037) (0.0041)
Constant -60.5081 -96.4625 -81.3890 -96.9368 -1.2856 -0.1847 1.0510 -0.7887
(64.7150) (68.5376) (65.7795) (68.9311) (1.2394) (1.3579) (1.2530) (1.3411)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Province fixed effects no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.0606 0.2631 0.0703 0.2698 0.0436 0.2191 0.0533 0.2331
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Control variables include both 1911 levels and 1901-1911 
differences as described in the notes in table 4. Swing is defined in section 5.1
Estrema vote percentage change Estrema net seats gainTable 17. Enfranchisement and the Gentiloni Pact
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Gentiloni -10.0659*** -8.756*** -3.8520 4.5597 -0.3573*** -0.3564*** -0.4339** -0.4847**
(2.0428) (2.2577) (8.7963) (9.8152) (0.0371) (0.0421) (0.2142) (0.2359)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) 0.2369* 0.4014** -0.0029 -0.0085**
(0.1208) (0.1642) (0.0027) (0.0035)
Gentiloni x Enfranchisement (1909-
1913)
-0.0976 -0.2051 0.0012 0.0020
(0.1437) (0.1586) (0.0032) (0.0035)
Constant -23.0428 -59.8493 -34.8873 -51.1760 1.4667 0.4108 1.6124 0.1328
(62.1742) (66.2587) (62.4906) (65.9349) (1.1261) (1.3096) (1.1370) (1.2960)
All controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Province fixed effects no no no no no no no no
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.0874 0.2769 0.0939 0.2851 0.1796 0.3306 0.1822 0.3402
vote percentage of Extrema candidates net seat gain of Estrema 
Notes. Gentiloni is a dummy variable equal to 1 in electoral districts where one of the candidates signed the Gentiloni pact. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Other control variables  are defined in the Notes in Table 4Table 18: Turnout in swing and Gentiloni electoral districts
Dep. variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
swing -3.2667*** -3.7230*** -19.5945*** -15.3566**
(1.109) (1.250) (6.761) (7.285)
Enfranchisement (1909-1913) -0.5491*** -0.4082*** -0.3348*** -0.2478**
(0.096) (0.124) (0.067) (0.098)
swing x enfranchisement 0.2195** 0.1649
(0.098) (0.106)
gentiloni -1.2143 -2.5504** 1.7784 -4.5536
(1.1346) (1.1672) (5.709) (5.799)
gentiloni x enfranchisement -0.0396 0.0325
(0.085) (0.086)
Constant -19.4387 15.5300 3.4514 7.0832 -5.4009 31.4087 9.6631 22.2284
(35.143) (38.620) (31.804) (37.452) (35.685) (40.460) (33.662) (40.289)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.1198 0.3190 0.2123 0.3406 0.1068 0.3119 0.1694 0.3230
 
Change in turnout percentage (1909‐1913)
Notes: Control variables include both 1911 levels and 1901-1911 differences as described in the notes to table 4. Swing is defined in Section 5.1. Gentiloni is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 in electoral districts where one of the candidates signed the Gentiloni pact. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table A1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Enfranchisement (1909-13) 66.134 11.929 19.634 87.159
Enfranchisement (1904-09) 12.99133 7.334 -29.490 43.991
vote percentage change of Estrema 
candidates (1909-1913)
7.632 23.142 -67.907 100.000
vote percentage change of Estrema 
candidates (1904-1909)
-1.101 21.922 -99.458 90.258
∆seats Estrema (1909-1913) 0.104 0.452 -1.000 1.000
∆seats Estrema (1904-1909) 0.051 0.394 -1.000 1.000
∆candidacy Estrema (1904-1909) 0.120 0.465 -1.000 1.000
∆candidacy Estrema (1904-1909) -0.148 0.457 -1.000 1.000
∆HHI (1909-1913) -0.062 0.229 -0.755 0.630
∆HHI (1904-1909) 0.021 0.208 -0.517 0.641
∆aristocrat (1909-1913) -0.006 0.341 -1.000 1.000
∆aristocrat (1904-1909) -0.012 0.349 -1.000 1.000
∆elite (1909-1913) -0.016 0.402 -1.000 1.000
∆elite (1904-1909) -0.020 0.407 -1.000 1.000
gentiloni 0.441 0.497 0.000 1.000
inequality 0.199 0.166 0.042 1.000
male illiteracy rate 1911 33.613 18.791 4.000 68.753
swing district 0.445 0.497 0.000 1.000
North-West 0.293 0.456 0.000 1.000
North-East 0.098 0.298 0.000 1.000
Centre 0.236 0.425 0.000 1.000
South 0.372 0.484 0.000 1.000
Notes: The number of observations is 508 for all variables. North-West includes Sardegna, Piemonte, 
Lombardia, Liguria. North-East includes Veneto (which also incuded current Friuli-Venezia Giulia); Centre 
includes all the remaining regions with the exception of the former Kingdom of Naples, which constitutes 
the South. All other variables are defined in the main text.